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Abstract
In this thesis, we consider four optimal stopping problems with stopping
constraints. Chapter 2 introduces a new class of Dynkin games, where the
two players are allowed to make their stopping decisions at a sequence of
exogenous Poisson arrival times. The value function and the associated optimal
stopping strategy are characterized by the solution of a backward stochastic
differential equation. Furthermore, the chapter applies the model to study
the optimal conversion and calling strategies of convertible bonds, and their
asymptotics when the Poisson intensity goes to infinity. Chapter 3 generalizes
the work in Chapter 2 from the risk-neutral criteria and common signal times
for both players to the risk-sensitive criteria and two heterogeneous signal
times. Chapter 4 considers a two-player zero-sum optimal switching games
with stopping constraints. We prove the chain of inequalities involving the four
values of the game, and the values of both the static and dynamic games exist
in the case when the running and terminal rewards are separated. Chapter 5
studies a mixed stochastic control and constrained optimal stopping problem
which models rollover debt decisions in an incomplete market. In addition to
the rollover decisions, the creditor can also choose a control strategy to trade in
risky assets correlated with the fundamental assets. In the case of exponential
utility, we prove the complete characterization and obtain the exponential




Optimal stopping plays a classical and very important role in the field of
financial mathematics, due to its various applications in finance and economics.
The set-ups in the majority of previous works are either in continuous time
where stopping times take any value in a certain time interval, or in discrete time
where stopping times only take values in a pre-specified time grid. However,
both set-ups have their own limitations: in the former formulation, no restriction
is imposed on the class of admissible stopping times, which seems sometimes
unrealistic; in the latter setting, to the best knowledge of the author, it seems
impossible for us to obtain a closed form solution for optimal stopping in the
case of discrete time, which is sometimes valuable for subsequent analysis.
To overcome the aforementioned limitations in both models, in this thesis,
we consider a hybrid of continuous and discrete times and investigate some
constrained optimal stopping problems, where the player(s) is (are) allowed
to stop at a sequence(s) of random times generated by an exogenous Poisson
process(es) serving as a signal process(es), which can be regarded as exogenous
constraints on the players’ ability to stop. On the one hand, the constraints
may represent the liquidity effects, indicating the times at which the underlying
stochastic processes are available to stop. On the other hand, the constraints
can also be seen as information constraints. The player(s) is (are) allowed
to make stopping decisions at all times, but is (are) only able to observe the
underlying stochastic processes at Poisson arrival times.
This kind of constrained optimal stopping problems was first studied by
Dupuis and Wang [25], where they used it to model perpetual American options
exercised at exogenous Poisson arrival times. See also Lempa [55], Menaldi
and Robin [61] and Hobson and Zeng [39] for further extensions of this type
of optimal stopping models. From a different perspective, Liang [57] made
a connection between constrained optimal stopping problems with penalized
backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs). The corresponding optimal
switching (impulse control) models were studied by Liang and Wei [59], and
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by Menaldi and Robin [62] [63] with more general signal times and state
spaces. All of the aforementioned references are concerned with single-player
optimisation problems. To the best of our knowledge, multi-player optimal
stopping problems with this type of constraints on stopping times, the topics
under which Chapter 2-4 fall, have not been studied before. Chapter 5 studies
single-player mixed stochastic control and optimal stopping problems with
stopping constraints.
In this chapter, we first review constrained single-player optimal stopping
problems to fix ideas, and then conclude the chapter with a more precise outline
of the remainder of the thesis.
1.1 Constrained single-player optimal stopping prob-
lems
Let (Wt)t≥0 be a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion defined on a filtered
probability (Ω,F ,F = {Ft}t≥0,P) satisfying the usual conditions. Let {Ti}i≥0
be the arrival times of an independent Poisson process with intensity λ and
minimal augmented filtration H = {Ht}t≥0. Denote the smallest filtration
generated by F and H as G = {Gt}t≥0, i.e. Gt = Ft ∨ Ht. Without loss of
generality, we also assume that T0 = 0 and T∞ =∞. Let T be a fixed finite
horizon representing the terminal time of the game, and M : Ω 7→ N be an
integer-valued random variable such that TM is the next Poisson arrival time
following T , i.e. M(ω) :=
∑
i≥1 i1{Ti−1(ω)≤T (ω)<Ti(ω)}. Let f : Ω× [0, T ]→ R
be an F-progressively measurable process, S : Ω× [0, T ]→ R be a continuous
F-progressively measurable process, and ξ : Ω → R be an FT -measurable
random variable (all of them satisfying suitable integrability conditions).






fs ds+ Sτ1{τ<T} + ξ1{τ≥T}
]
where the control set of the player is defined by
RTi(λ) = {G-stopping time τ for τ(ω) = TN (ω) where i ≤ N ≤M(ω)}
(1.1.1)
for any integer i ≥ 0. Liang [57] proved that
vλ = V λ0 ,
and the optimal stopping time is given by
τλ,∗ = inf{TN ≥ T1 : V λTN ≤ STN } ∧ TM ,
2
where V λ is the first component of the solution to the following BSDE












with x+ denoting the positive part of any real number x, i.e. x+ = max{x, 0}.
Compared to standard single-player optimal stopping problems, there are
two new features of the above constrained single-player optimal stopping
problems. First, there is a control constraint in the sense that only stopping at
Poisson arrival times is allowed. Second, the player is not allowed to stop at
the initial starting time. Instead, the player is only allowed to stop from the
first Poisson time onwards.
A natural question for this formulation is: how does it differ from a standard
single-player optimal stopping problem? Indeed, a connection can be established
between the constrained problem and the standard problem, where the set-up
is the same as above, except the control set is replaced with R0, which denotes






fs ds+ Sτ1{τ<T} + ξ1{τ≥T}
]
.
El-Karoui et al [28] proved that v = V0 and the optimal stopping time is given
by τ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Vt = St}∧T , where V is the first component of the solution
to the following reflected BSDE with the reflecting barrier S:










for t ∈ [0, T ], under the constraints (i) Vt ≥ St for 0 ≤ t ≤ T ; (ii)
∫ T
0 (Vt − St) dKt =
0.
An interesting observation is that BSDE (1.1.2) is often used to construct
the solution of the reflected BSDE (1.1.3). Intuitively, when V λ falls below S,
there will be a penalty λ
(
Ss − V λs
)
incurred, so BSDE (1.1.2) is also refereed
to as the penalized equation. Under suitable integrability conditions, El-Karoui







|V λt − Vt|2 +
∫ T
0









Ss − V λs
)+
ds, and thus, the values of the two single-player





1.2 Outline of the thesis
Dynkin games, as a generalization of single-player optimal stopping problems,
are two-player zero-sum game on stopping times, where two players determine
their optimal stopping times as their strategies. In Chapter 2, we consider a
new class of Dynkin games, which we call as constrained Dynkin games, where
the two players are allowed to make their stopping decisions σ and τ at a
sequence of exogenous Poisson arrival times, in order to minimize/maximize










E [R(σ, τ)] ,
where the control set RT1(λ) is in (1.1.1). The two value functions vλ and vλ
are called the upper and lower value of the game, where the names are justified
by the following inequality
vλ ≥ vλ,
because, on the upper (resp. lower) value, the maximizing (resp. minimizing)
player is given an advantage by being allowed to look at the minmizing (resp.
maximizing) player’s stopping strategy before choosing his/her own. We prove
the value of the constrained Dynkin game exists (i.e. vλ = vλ) and characterize
the value function and the associated optimal stopping strategy by the solution
of a penalized BSDE, which is widely used to approximate the solution of a
reflected BSDE with double obstacles and the corresponding continuous time
Dynkin game.
We also apply the constrained Dynkin game to study the optimal conversion
and calling strategies of convertible bonds. On the one hand, the bondholder
decides whether to keep the bond to collect coupons or to convert it to the
firm’s stocks in order to maximize the bond value. On the other hand, the
issuing firm has the right to call the bond, and presumably acts to maximize
the equity value of the firm by minimizing the bond value. This creates a
two-player, zero-sum Dynkin game.
Chapter 3 generalizes the above model of constrained Dynkin games in two
aspects: First, it takes into consideration of both players’ attitudes towards
risks by replacing the linear expectation E[·] with the nonlinear expectation
Ẽ [·] := g−1(E [g(·)])
for some strictly increasing function g as a risk-sensitive function. To the best
of our knowledge, the study of risk-sensitive Dynkin games is still lacking, no
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matter with or without constraints on stopping time strategies. The current
chapter offers a first step to understand risk-sensitive Dynkin games. Second,
one limitation of the constrained Dynkin game model in Chapter 2 is that both
players face the same stopping constraint, which seems sometimes unrealistic.
In this chapter, the control constraints for both players are modelled to be
different in the sense that they are allowed to stop at two heterogeneous
sequences of Poisson arrival times. Due to the introduction of constraints on
stopping times and risk-sensitive criteria, we call this new class of Dynkin
games as constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin games. We prove the value of
the constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin game exists and characterize the value
function and the associated optimal stopping strategy by the solution of a
BSDE. Furthermore, the chapter establishes a connection of constrained risk-
sensitive Dynkin games with a class of stochastic differential games via Krylov’s
randomized stopping technique.
Optimal switching is a generalisation of optimal stopping, where one or
more agents determine their optimal sequence of times to switch a system’s
operational modes, with various applications in economics and finance. In
Chapter 4, we consider a new type of two-player zero-sum optimal switching
games, which we call as constrained optimal switching games, where two players
are only allowed to switch at two heterogeneous exogenous sequences of Poisson
arrival times, in order to minimise/maximise some payoff function. The payoff
function also includes the switching payments to the othe player when they
make their switching decisions. Similar to the Dynkin game setting in the
previous two chapters, to complete the description of the game, it is necessary
to specify the information available to each player.
The lower (resp. upper) static value of the game is defined by letting the
maximizing (resp. minimizing) player make the decisions first, followed by the
minimizing (resp. maximizing) player making the decisions. These two values
are called static, because one of the players is able to know the decisions of the
other player for the entire duration of the game, where some information about
the future is being revealed to the player given advantage. This motivates
us to define the dynamic version of the game by introducing the notion of
non-anticipating strategies, where one of the players is still given advantage but
the information about the other player’s decisions are revealed in a dynamic
way. The main result of this chapter is the chain of inequalities involving
the above four values of the game. We prove the values of both the static
and dynamic games exist in the case when the running and terminal rewards
are separated. At the end of the chapter, we apply the constrained optimal
switching games to study the duopolistic competition in resource extraction,
and give a complete description of the structure of switching regions.
Chapter 5 extends the theory of constrained optimal stopping problems
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in a different direction: we study a mixed stochastic control and constrained
optimal stopping problem which models a risk-averse creditor’s decisions, in an
incomplete market, over whether to roll over or to withdraw the funding at a
sequence of rollover dates, which are modelled by a sequence of Poisson arrival
times. In addition to the rollover decisions, the creditor can also choose a
control strategy to trade in risky assets correlated with the fundamental assets.
The first main result of this chapter is the verification theorem characterizing
the value function of the problem and its associated optimal mixed strategy
in terms of the solution of a penalized partial differential equation (PDE). In
the case of exponential utility, we prove the complete characterization and
obtain the exponential indifference bond price and its associated optimal mixed
strategy. Furthermore, we investigate the impacts of parameter values on the
bond price and conduct some numerical experiments to examine the shapes of
the stopping and continuation regions of the problem in an incomplete market.




Dynkin Games with Poisson
Random Intervention Times
2.1 Introduction
Dynkin games are games on stopping times, where two players determine their
optimal stopping times as their strategies. The game was first introduced by
Dynkin [26], and later generalized by Neveu [68] in 1970s. In this game, two
players observe two stochastic processes, say L and U , and their aims are to
maximize/minimize the expected value of the payoff
R(σ, τ) = Lτ1{τ≤σ} + Uσ1{σ<τ}
over stopping times τ and σ, respectively. In a discrete-time setting, under the
assumption that U ≥ L, Neveu proved the existence of the game value and its
associated optimal strategy.
Since then, there has been a considerable development of Dynkin games.
The corresponding continuous time models were developed, among others,
by Bismut [8], Alario-Nazaret et al [1], Lepeltier and Maingueneau [56] and
Morimoto [65]. In order to relax the condition U ≥ L, Yasuda [80] proposed to
extend the class of strategies to randomized stopping times, and proved that
the game value exists under merely an integrability condition. Rosemberg et al
[71], Touzi and Vielle [78] and Laraki and Solan [52] further extended his work
in this direction. If the two players in the game are with asymmetric payoffs,
then it gives rise to a nonzero-sum Dynkin game. See, for example, Hamadene
and Zhang [33] and more recently De Angelis et al [19] with more references
therein. A robust version of Dynkin games can be found in Bayraktar and Yao
[5] if the players are ambiguous about their probability model.
The set-ups in all the aforementioned works are either in continuous time
where stopping times take any value in a certain time interval, or in discrete
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time where stopping times only take values in a pre-specified time grid. In this
chapter, we consider a hybrid of continuous and discrete times, and introduce
a new type of Dynkin games, where both players are allowed to stop at a
sequence of random times generated by an exogenous Poisson process serving
as a signal process. We call such a Dynkin game a constrained Dynkin game.
The underlying Poisson process can be regarded as an exogenous constraint
on the players’ abilities to stop, so it may represent liquidity effects, indicating
the times both players are allowed to stop the game freely and at no other
time can they exit the game. In the case of hedging some derivative on a
thinly-traded asset, the adjustments to the hedge is only allowed when someone
in the market is willing to buy or sell the asset. To simplify the problem, we
model such a liquidation shock (someone is prepared to buy or sell the asset in
the above example) as the arrival times of an exogenous Poisson process, and
players only make their decisions when such a shock arrives. Moreover, the
Poisson process can also be seen as an information constraint. The players are
allowed to make their stopping decisions at all times, but they are only able to
observe the underlying stochastic processes at Poisson times.
Our main result is Theorem 2.2.4, which characterizes the value of the
constrained Dynkin game and its associated optimal stopping strategy in terms
of the solution of a penalized BSDE. The latter is widely used to approximate
the solution of a reflected BSDE with double obstacles and the corresponding
continuous time Dynkin game. The main idea to solve the constrained Dynkin
game is to introduce a family of auxiliary games (see (2.3.13)-(2.3.14)), for
which standard dynamic programming principle holds. Furthermore, following
from the convergence of penalized BSDE to reflected BSDE (see, for example,
[16]) and the penalized BSDE characterization (2.2.6) of the constrained Dynkin
game, we also make a connection with standard Dynkin games in continuous
time. That is, the value of the constrained Dynkin game will converge to the
value of its continuous time counterpart when the Poisson intensity goes to
infinity.
We then apply the constrained Dynkin game to study convertible bonds. In
a convertible bond, the bondholder decides whether to keep the bond to collect
coupons or to convert it to the firm’s stocks. She will choose a conversion
strategy to maximize the bond value. On the other hand, the issuing firm has
the right to call the bond, and presumably acts to maximize the equity value
of the firm by minimizing the bond value. This creates a two-person, zero-sum
Dynkin game.
Traditionally, convertible bond models often assume that both the bond
holder and the firm are allowed to stopped at any stopping time adapted to
the firm’s fundamental (such as its stock prices). In reality, there may exist
some liquidation constraint as an external shock, and both players only make
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their decisions when such a shock arrives. We model such a liquidation shock
as the arrival times of an exogenous Poisson process, and thus the convertible
bond model falls into the framework of constrained Dynkin games. A similar
idea has first appeared in the modeling of debt run problems (see [58]), which
can be formulated as optimal stopping problems with Poisson arrival times.
Furthermore, in a Markovian setting, we derive explicitly the optimal
stopping strategies for both the bondholder and the firm. We show that the
optimal stopping rules of the two players depend on the relationship between
the coupon rate c, dividend rate q, interest rate r and surrender price K. For
the firm, its optimal stopping strategy depends on the relationship between
c, r+λq+λqK and rK. If c ≥ rK, it is optimal for the firm to call the bond back
as soon as possible; if c ≤ r+λq+λqK, the firm will postpone the calling time of
the bond as late as possible; if r+λq+λqK < c < rK, the firm’s calling strategy
is determined by an optimal calling boundary, which is obtained by solving a
free boundary problem. In contrast, the investor’s optimal stopping strategy
depends on the relationship between c and r+λq+λqK. If c >
r+λ
q+λqK, the investor
will delay her conversion time as late as possible; if c ≤ r+λq+λqK, her conversion
strategy is determined by an optimal conversion boundary.
Turning to the literature, the optimal stopping problem with constraints on
the stopping times was introduced by Dupuis and Wang [25], when they used
it to model perpetual American options exercised at exogenous Poisson arrival
times. See also Lempa [55] and Menaldi and Robin [61] for further extensions
of this type of optimal stopping problems. On the other hand, Liang [57] made
a connection between such kind of optimal stopping problems with penalized
BSDE. The corresponding optimal switching (impulse control) problems were
studied by Liang and Wei [59] and more recently by Menaldi and Robin [62]
with more general signal times and state spaces.
The study of convertible bonds dated back to Brennan and Schwartz [11]
and Ingersoll [44]. However, it was Sirbu et al [73] who first analyzed the optimal
strategy of perpetual convertible bonds (see also Sirbu and Shreve [74] for the
finite horizon counterpart). They reduced the problem from a Dynkin game
to an optimal stopping problem, and discussed when call precedes conversion
and vice versa. Several more realistic features of convertible bonds have been
taken into account since then. For example, Bielecki et al [7] considered the
problem of the decomposition of a convertible bond into bond component and
option component. Crepey and Rahal [15] studied the convertible bond with
call protection, which is typically path dependent. Chen et al [13] considered
the tax benefit and bankruptcy cost for convertible bonds. For a complete
literature review, we refer to the aforementioned papers with references therein.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 contains the problem
formulation and main result, with its proof provided in Section 2.3. In Section
9
2.4, we establish a connection with standard Dynkin games. In Section 2.5,
we apply the constrained Dynkin game to study the convertible bonds in a
Markovian setting, and derive the explicit optimal stopping strategies and the
corresponding free boundaries under various situations. Section 2.6 carries out
an asymptotic analysis of the game values and the free boundaries when the
Poisson intensity goes to infinity.
2.2 Constrained Dynkin games
Let (Wt)t≥0 be a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion defined on a filtered
probability space (Ω,F ,F = {Ft}t≥0,P) satisfying the usual conditions. Let
{Ti}i≥0 be the arrival times of an independent Poisson process with intensity λ
and minimal augmented filtration H = {Ht}t≥0. Denote the smallest filtration
generated by F and H as G = {Gt}t≥0, i.e. Gt = Ft ∨ Ht. Without loss of
generality, we also assume that T0 = 0 and T∞ =∞.
Let T be a finite F-stopping time representing the random terminal time
of the game, and M : Ω 7→ N be an integer-valued random variable such that





For any integer i ≥ 0, let us define the control set of both players as follows
RTi(λ) = {G-stopping time τ for τ(ω) = TN (ω) where i ≤ N ≤M(ω)}
where the subscript Ti in RTi(λ) represents the smallest stopping time that
is allowed to choose, and λ represents the intensity of the underlying Poisson
process.
Consider the following constrained Dynkin game, where two players choose
their respective stopping times σ, τ ∈ RT1(λ) in order to minimize/maximize





+ e−rT ξ1{σ∧τ≥T} + e
−rτLτ1{τ<T,τ≤σ} + e
−rσUσ1{σ<T,σ<τ} (2.2.1)
where r > 0 is the discount rate, and f , as a real-valued F-progressively
measurable process, is the running payoff. The terminal payoff is U if σ
happens firstly, L if τ happens firstly or σ and τ happen simultaneously, and
ξ otherwise, where L and U are two real-valued F-progressively measurable
processes, and ξ is a real-valued FT -measurable random variable.
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E [R(σ, τ)] . (2.2.3)
The game (2.2.2)-(2.2.3) is said to have value vλ if vλ = vλ = vλ. It is standard
to show that if there exists a saddle point (σ∗, τ∗) ∈ RT1(λ)×RT1(λ) such that
E [R(σ∗, τ)] ≤ E [R(σ∗, τ∗)] ≤ E [R(σ, τ∗)] for every (σ, τ) ∈ RT1(λ)×RT1(λ),
then the value of this game exists and equals vλ = E [R(σ∗, τ∗)] .
There are two new features of the above constrained Dynkin game. First,
there is a control constraint in the sense that only stopping at Poisson arrival
times is allowed. Second, the players are not allowed to stop at the initial
starting time. Instead, they are only allowed to stop from the first Poisson
time onwards.
We also consider an auxiliary game related to the above constrained Dyknin
game by replacing the control set in (2.2.2)-(2.2.3) with RT0(λ), so the players












E [R(σ, τ)] . (2.2.5)
Note that the difference between (2.2.4)-(2.2.5) and (2.2.2)-(2.2.3) is that the
former is allowed to stop at the initial starting time T0 = 0, while the latter not.
In other words, the players in (2.2.4)-(2.2.5) first make their stopping decisions
and then move forward, while in (2.2.2)-(2.2.3) they first move forward and
then make their decisions. We shall show that if the game (2.2.2)-(2.2.3)
has value vλ, then the value of (2.2.4)-(2.2.5) also exists and is given by
v̂λ = min{U0,max{vλ, L0}}, so the key is to solve the game (2.2.2)-(2.2.3).
2.2.1 Main result of this chapter
To solve the above constrained Dynkin games, we introduce the following
BSDE with a random terminal time T :




















for t ≥ 0. And also we set Vt ≡ ξ for t ≥ T . Note that the above BSDE (2.2.6)
is often used to construct the solution of a reflected BSDE with two reflecting
barriers L and U (cf. (2.4.3)). Intuitively, when V λ falls below L (or goes
above U), there will be a penalty λ(L−V λ) (or λ(V λ−U)) incurred, so BSDE
(2.2.6) is also refereed to as the penalized equation.
For later use, let us introduce the following spaces: for any given α ∈ R
and n ∈ N,


























H2,n and S2,n for the ease of notation.
Remark 2.2.1 For the convenience of the reader, we give a short introduction
of BSDEs, and refer to the lecture notes [9] by Bouchard for the general
theory and its details. These equations were first introduced by Pardoux and
Peng in their pioneering work [69]. On a Brownian filtered probability space
(Ω,F ,F = {Ft}t≥0,P), given a R-valued random variable ξ ∈ L2,1 and g :
Ω× [0, T ]×R×Rd (called the driver of the BSDE), a solution to the BSDE







is a pair of Ft-adapted processes (Y, Z), typically in S2,1 × H2,d, such that
(2.2.7) holds. As opposed to forward SDEs, we prescribe its terminal condition
YT = ξ rather than its initial condition Y0 ∈ S2,1 ×H2,d.
The key idea of the Z component of the solution is to ensure that the process
Y is adapted. For simplicity, let us consider the case g ≡ 0. Then, a solution
(Y,Z) to BSDE (2.2.7) must satisfy




where Z is uniquely given by the martingale representation theorem





Assumption 2.2.2 For t ∈ [0, T ], Lt ≤ Ut, a.s, and moreover, (i) when T is
an unbounded stopping time, the running payoff f and the terminal payoffs L,
U and ξ are all bounded; (ii) when T is a bounded stopping time, the running
payoff f ∈ H2,1 and the terminal payoffs L ∈ S2,1, U ∈ S2,1 and ξ ∈ L2,1.
The assumption L ≤ U is crucial to the existence of the game value. On
the other hand, the conditions (i) and (ii) are to guarantee the existence and
uniqueness of the solution to BSDE (2.2.6), which will in turn be used to
construct the game value and its associated optimal stopping strategy.
Proposition 2.2.3 Suppose that Assumption 2.2.2 holds. Then, there exists
a unique solution (V λ, Zλ) to BSDE (2.2.6). Moreover, (i) when T is an
unbounded stopping time, V λ is continuous and bounded, and Zλ belongs to
H
2,d
−r ; (ii) when T is a bounded stopping time, the solution belongs to S
2,1×H2,d.
The proof essentially follows from Theorem 3.3 in [12] (when T is unboun-
ded) and Theorem 4.1 in [69] (when T is bounded) , so we omit its proof and
refer to [12] and [69] for the details. We are now in a position to state the
main result of this chapter.
Theorem 2.2.4 Suppose that Assumption 2.2.2 holds. Let (V λ, Zλ) be the
unique solution to BSDE (2.2.6). Then, the value of the constrained Dynkin
game (2.2.2)-(2.2.3) exists and is given by vλ = vλ = vλ = V λ0 . The corres-
ponding optimal stopping strategy is given by{
σ∗T1 = inf{TN ≥ T1 : V
λ
TN
≥ UTN } ∧ TM ;
τ∗T1 = inf{TN ≥ T1 : V
λ
TN
≤ LTN } ∧ TM .
(2.2.8)
Moreover, the value of the Dynkin game (2.2.4)-(2.2.5) also exists and is given






Theorem 2.2.4 solves a wide class of problems in a unified manner, covering
from Markovian to non-Markovian situations and from fixed to random finite
horizons. In the one-dimensional homogenous Markovian setting, there usually
exists a threshold strategy. For this, we will discuss a specific convertible-bond
example in Section 2.5. In the rest of the section, we list several path-dependent
examples, which are difficult to dealt with under Markovian framework (at
least it needs a case-by-case study) but covered by Theorem 2.2.4.
(i) Path-dependent payoffs L and U . Let T be fixed so it is a constant
stopping time and S be a one-dimensional positive diffusion process adapted to
F. For δ > 0, consider an Israeli option written on S with maturity T , where
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the holder may exercise to get a normal claim but the writer is punished by an
amount δS for annulling the contract early (see [49]). The payoffs L and U may
take the form Lt = max{m,S∗t } and Ut = max{m,S∗t }+ δSt for m > S0 and





0 Sudu + δSt, it is called Israeli integral option (see [4]). Under
mild integrability assumption on S as in Assumption 2.2.2, Theorem 2.2.4
shows that the values of both Israeli options exist and the associated optimal
strategies can be characterized via the solution to (2.2.6).
(ii) Path-dependent stopping time T . Stopping times are widely used in
insurance as indicators of a variety of risks. Let S be a one-dimensional positive
diffusion process adapted to F. We may consider the following stopping times
as the terminal time of the game: drawdown stopping time T = inf{t ≥
0 : S∗t − St ≥ m} for m ≥ 0; occupation stopping time T = inf{t ≥ m :∫ t
0 1{Su∈A}du ≥ m} for A ⊂ R+. Note that unlike the standard first-passage-
time (see θλ in Section 2.5), both types of path-dependent stopping times
need tailor-made analysis under Markovian framework, but can be covered by
Theorem 2.2.4 in a unified manner.
2.3 Proof of Theorem 2.2.4
We first give an equivalent formulation of the constrained Dynkin game (2.2.2)-




Gs : A ∩ {Ti ≤ s} ∈ Gs for s ≥ 0
















and thus, the upper and lower values of the constrained Dynkin game (2.2.2)-
(2.2.3) can be rewritten in the following form



















where the modified payoff function is given by
R̃(σ, τ) = ξ̃1{σ∧τ≥T} + L̃τ1{τ<T,τ≤σ} + Ũσ1{σ<T,σ<τ}. (2.3.6)
Thus, to prove Theorem 2.2.4, it is equivalent to show that
Qλ0 = q
λ = qλ = qλ,
and the optimal stopping strategy is given by{
σ∗T1 = inf{TN ≥ T1 : Q
λ
TN
≥ ŨTN } ∧ TM ,
τ∗T1 = inf{TN ≥ T1 : Q
λ
TN
≤ L̃TN } ∧ TM ,
(2.3.7)






with V λt being the first component of the solution to BSDE (2.2.6). Note that,





e−rsfs ds = ξ̃. (2.3.9)
To prove the above assertions, we start with the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3.1 Suppose that Assumption 2.2.2 holds. Then, for any 1 ≤ n ≤









Proof. It is obvious (2.3.10) holds for n = M + 1. In the following, we only
focus on the case when 1 ≤ n ≤ M . Applying Itô’s formula to αtQλt , where
αt = e
−λt, we obtain that
αt∧TQ
λ











for t ≥ 0, where
Fs(Q
λ
s ) := Q
λ
s + (L̃s −Qλs )+ − (Qλs − Ũs)+ = min{Ũs,max{Qλs , L̃s}}
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where the second equality holds by taking the conditional expectation with
respect to GTn−1 .
On the other hand, we use the conditional density λe−λ(x−Tn−1) dx of Tn
to calculate the right-hand-side of (2.3.10):
E
[













which proves (2.3.10) holds.
Since QλTn−1 in (2.3.10) is solved recursively for n = M + 1,M, · · · , 1 and
TM is a finite G-stopping time, it is obvious that the backward recursive
equation (2.3.10) admits a unique solution, QλTn−1 , which is given by (2.3.8), is
then the unique solution of the recursive equation (2.3.10) for 1 ≤ n ≤M + 1.
As a direct consequence of Lemma 2.3.1, Q̂λ, which is defined by
Q̂λt := ξ̃1{t≥T} + min{Ũ ,max{Qλ, L̃}}1{t<T}, (2.3.11)
where Qλ is given by (2.3.8), satisfies the following recursive equation: For
1 ≤ n ≤M + 1,









which also admits a unique solution since we can calculate its solution backwards
in a recursive way for n = M + 1,M, · · · , 1.
We will show that Q̂λTn−1 is actually the value of an auxiliary constrained
Dynkin game starting from Tn−1, whose upper and lower values are defined as
q̂
λ




















where R̃(σ, τ) is given by (2.3.6). The auxiliary constrained Dynkin game




























for every (σ, τ) ∈ RTn−1(λ)×RTn−1(λ).
When n = 1, (2.3.13)-(2.3.14) corresponds to the auxiliary constrained
Dynkin game (2.2.4)-(2.2.5). The difference between the auxiliary game and
the original game is that the players first make their stopping decisions and
then move forward in the former game, while in the latter game they first move
forward and then make their decisions.
Lemma 2.3.2 Suppose that Assumption 2.2.2 holds. Then, for any 1 ≤ n ≤
M + 1, the value of the auxiliary constrained Dynkin game starting from Tn−1
(2.3.13)-(2.3.14) exists. Its value q̂λTn−1 satisfies the recursive equation (2.3.12),
namely,








Hence, q̂λTn−1 = Q̂
λ
Tn−1
, where the latter is given by (2.3.11). The optimal
stopping strategy of the auxiliary constrained Dynkin game (2.3.13)-(2.3.14) is
given by {
σ̂∗n−1 = inf{TN ≥ Tn−1 : q̂λTN = ŨTN } ∧ TM ;
τ̂∗n−1 = inf{TN ≥ Tn−1 : q̂λTN = L̃TN } ∧ TM .
(2.3.15)
















Indeed, for 1 ≤ n ≤M , taking conditional expectation on GTn yields that
q̂
λ







































are interchangeable, which will be proved in the next step.
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= ξ̃, which follows from the definition of the upper value (2.3.13) of
the auxiliary constrained Dynkin game.
It is also obvious that q̂
λ
Tn−1 satisfies (2.3.12) for n = M + 1, and hence, it
satisfies the recursive equation (2.3.12) for 1 ≤ n ≤M + 1. Symmetrically, we
can obtain that q̂λ
Tn−1
also satisfies the recursive equation (2.3.12). Since (2.3.12)









the latter is given by (2.3.11).





are interchangeable, i.e. (2.3.19) below holds. To this end, for any





, τ ∈ RTn(λ)
)
(2.3.17)
is an increasing directed set. Indeed, if we choose arbitrary τ1, τ2 ∈ RTn(λ)




, for j = 1, 2. Then, there exists τ0 ∈ RTn(λ),












, σ ∈ RTn(λ)
)
(2.3.18)
is a decreasing directed set. Under Assumption 2.2.2, it is obvious that both
(2.3.17) and (2.3.18) are uniformly integrable, and therefore, by Proposition














































Step 3. In this step, we prove that (σ̂∗n−1, τ̂
∗
n−1), which is given by (2.3.15), is
indeed the optimal stopping strategy for the auxiliary Dynkin game starting




































is a G̃-submartingale for any σ ∈ RTn−1(λ).



























where the second last equality follows from the definition (2.3.15) of (σ̂∗n−1, τ̂
∗
n−1).
Using the similar arguments, if the supermartingale property (ii) and the



























As a direct consequence of (2.3.20)-(2.3.22), we can obtain (σ̂∗n−1, τ̂
∗
n−1),
which is given by (2.3.15), is indeed an optimal stopping strategy of the auxiliary
constrained Dynkin game (2.3.13)-(2.3.14).
Step 4. It remains to prove the martingale property (i), the supermartingale
property (ii) and the submartingale property (iii) in Step 3. Indeed, for
19














































It follows from the definition (2.3.15) of (σ̂∗n−1, τ̂
∗
n−1) that, conditional on the






























so the martingale property (i) has been proved.


































where the inequality follows from the fact that, conditional on the set {σ̂∗n−1 ∧
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This proves the supermartingale property (ii). Likewise, the submartingale
property (iii) can be proved in a similar way, and the proof of this lemma is
thus completed.
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 2.2.4. By Lemma 2.3.1 and
































1 ) in (2.3.15) is the optimal stopping strategy of the auxiliary
constrained Dynkin game starting from T1. Similarly, we can obtain that, for












































It is obvious that qλ ≥ qλ, and thusQλ0 = qλ = qλ = qλ. As a direct consequence
of (2.3.23)-(2.3.25), we can obtain (σ̂∗1, τ̂
∗
1 ) in (2.3.15) is indeed an optimal
stopping strategy of the constrained Dynkin game starting (2.3.4)-(2.3.5).
We conclude the proof by proving (σ̂∗1, τ̂
∗
1 ) is actually (σ
∗
T1
, τ∗T1) in (2.3.7).
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Indeed,
σ̂∗1 = inf{TN ≥ T1 : Q̂λTN = ŨTN } ∧ TM
= inf{TN ≥ T1 : QλTN ≥ ŨTN } ∧ TM = σ
∗
T1 ,




2.4 Connection with standard Dynkin games
In this section, we make the connection between constrained Dynkin games
and standard Dynkin games. Let T be a fixed finite horizon. We show that,
when λ→∞, the value vλ of the constrained Dynkin game converges to the
value of the standard Dynkin game.
The set-up of a standard Dynkin game is the same as in Section 2.2 except
that the control set of the player is replaced with R0, which denotes the set of
F-stopping times valued in [0, T ]. Define the corresponding upper and lower










E [R(σ, τ)] (2.4.2)
where the payoff function R(σ, τ) is given by (2.2.1). This standard game
is said to have value v if v = v = v, and (σ∗, τ∗) ∈ R0 × R0 is called a
saddle point of the game if E [R(σ∗, τ)] ≤ E [R(σ∗, τ∗)] ≤ E [R(σ, τ∗)] for
every (σ, τ) ∈ R0 ×R0.
Proposition 2.4.1 Suppose that Assumption 2.2.2 holds and, moreover, both
L and U are continuous and satisfy LT ≤ ξ ≤ UT . Then, the value v of the
Dynkin game (2.4.1)-(2.4.2) exists and, moreover, limλ↑∞ v
λ = v.
Proof. To solve the Dynkin game (2.4.1)-(2.4.2), we introduce the following
reflected BSDE defined on a finite horizon [0, T ]:













for t ∈ [0, T ], under the constraints (i) Lt ≤ Vt ≤ Ut, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T ; (ii)∫ T




0 (Ut − Vt) dK
−
t = 0. By a solution to the reflected
BSDE (2.4.3), we mean a triplet of F-progressively measurable processes
(V,Z,K), where K := K+ −K− with K+ and K− being increasing processes




It follows from Cvitanic and Karatzas [16] that (2.4.3) is well-posed and
admits a unique solution. [16] shows that the value of the Dynkin game (2.4.1)-
(2.4.2) exists and is given by the solution of the reflected BSDE (2.4.3), i.e.
v = v = v = V0.
To prove the second assertion, we note that BSDE (2.2.6) can be regarded
as a sequence of penalized BSDEs for (2.4.3), where the local time processes













V λs − Us
)+
ds,
with Kλ := Kλ,+ −Kλ,−. Since limλ↑∞E[supt∈[0,T ] |V λt − Vt|2] = 0 (see, for
example, [16]), the second assertion follows immediately.
2.5 Application to convertible bonds with random
intervention times
In this section, using the constrained Dynkin game introduced in Section 2.2,
we study convertible bonds for which both players are only allowed to stop at
a sequence of random intervention times.
Traditionally, convertible bond models often assume that both the bond
holder and the issuing firm are allowed to stopped at any stopping time adapted
to the firm’s fundamental (such as its stock prices). In reality, there may exist
some liquidation constraint as an external shock, and both players only make
their decisions when such a shock arrives. We model such a liquidation shock
as the arrival times of an exogenous Poisson process. A similar idea has
first appeared in the modeling of debt run problems (see [58]), which can be
formulated as optimal stopping problems with Poisson arrival times.
Assumption 2.5.1 Let d = 1. The firm’s stock price Ss, under the risk-








with Ss0 = s > 0, where the constants r, q, σ represent the risk-free interest




σ2 + q. (2.5.2)
Consider an investor purchasing a share of convertible bond, issued by a
firm as a perpetuity with a constant coupon rate c, at initial time t = 0. By
holding the convertible bond, the investor will continuously receive the coupon
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rate c from the firm until the contract is terminated. The investor has the
right to convert her bond to the firm’s stocks, while the firm has the right to
call the bond and force the bondholder to surrender her bond to the firm at a
sequence of Poisson arrival times {Tn}n≥1 with a constant intensity λ > 0.
In this section, we further assume an automatic conversion is triggered as
soon as the firm’s stock reaches a set price. The firm will force a conversion of
the convertible bond to stocks at the first Poisson arrival time after the stock
price exceeds the set price s̄ := K/γ. This additional term, on the one hand, is
motivated by real world financial contracts; on the other hand, it is critical in
ensuring the dominating condition is satisfied when applying the constrained
Dynkin game introduced in Section 2.2.
For later use, we define the first hitting time by an F-stopping time
θ := inf{u ≥ 0 : Ssu ≥ s̄},
and the first Poisson arrival time following θ by a G-stopping time
TM := inf{TN ≥ θ : N ≥ 1}.
Under the parameter condition (2.5.2), it is standard to prove θ is finite (see,
for example, Section 3.6 in [72]). In summary, there are three situations that
the contract might be terminated:
(i) if the firm calls the bond at some G-stopping time σ firstly, the bond-
holder will receive a pre-specified surrender price K at time σ;
(ii) if the investor chooses to convert her bond at some G-stopping time τ
firstly or both players choose to stop the contract simultaneously, the bond-
holder will obtain γSτ at time τ from converting her bond with a pre-specified
conversion rate γ ∈ (0, 1);
(iii) if neither the firm nor the investor stops the contract before θ, an
automatic conversion is triggered and the bondholder will obtain γSTM at time
TM from converting her bond with a pre-specified conversion rate γ ∈ (0, 1).
From a perspective of the investor, the expectation of the discounted payoff
at initial time t = 0 then equals, for σ, τ ∈ RT1(λ),
E[P λ(s;σ, τ)] = E
[ ∫ σ∧τ∧TM
0













where Lλ(s) := cr+λ +
λ
q+λγs.
Remark 2.5.2 For the convenience of the reader, we show the second equality
above holds. It follows from the tower property of conditional expectation that






e−ruc du+ e−rTMγSTM )|Fθ]1{τ∧σ≥θ}




Using the conditional density λe−λ(x−θ) dx of TM , we can further simplify the











e−ruc du+ e−rmγSsm) dm|Fθ]
= e−rθLλ(Ssθ).
The investor will choose τ ∈ RT1(λ) to maximize the bond value, while
the firm will choose σ ∈ RT1(λ) to maximize the equity value of the firm
by minimizing the bond value. This leads to a constrained Dynkin game as




















By applying Theorem 2.2.4, we can obtain the existence of the value of
the convertible bond. In particular, for s ∈ (0, s̄), we characterize the value
of the convertible bond and the corresponding optimal stopping strategy via
the solution of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) and the associated free
boundaries, respectively.
Proposition 2.5.3 Suppose that Assumption 2.5.1 holds. Define the infinites-
imal generator L0 = 12σ
2s2∂2ss+(r−q)s∂s−r. Then, the value of the constrained
convertible bond, denoted as vλ(s), exists: For s ∈ [s̄,∞), vλ(s) = Lλ(s); For
s ∈ (0, s̄), vλ(s) is the unique solution to the following ODE
− L0vλ = c+ λ(γs− vλ)+ − λ(vλ −K)+ (2.5.6)
with the boundary condition vλ(s̄) = Lλ(s̄).
25
Proof. For s ∈ [s̄,∞), it is easy to check vλ(s) = Lλ(s). Indeed,

































For s ∈ (0, s̄), we apply Theorem 2.2.4 with T = θ, Lt = γSst , Ut = K,
ft = c and ξ = L
λ(Ssθ) to (2.5.4)-(2.5.5), and obtain the convertible bond
value is vλ(s) = V λ,s0 , where V
λ,s is the first component of the solution to the
penalized BSDE




















for t ≥ 0, and moreover, the optimal stopping strategy is{
σ∗,λ = inf{TN ≥ T1 : V λ,sTN ≥ K} ∧ TM ;
τ∗,λ = inf{TN ≥ T1 : V λ,sTN ≤ γS
s
TN
} ∧ TM .
(2.5.8)
By the Markov property of S, we can have V λ,st = v
λ(Sst ), where v
λ solves
ODE (2.5.6) (the connection between BSDE and ODE is quite standard in the
BSDE literature, and thus we refer to Section 4 of [12] and Section 5 of [40]
for rigorous proofs).
Remark 2.5.4 In this Remark, we study the boundary condition at s = 0+.
Firstly, note that this game can be reduced to a one-player optimal stopping
problem in the case of s = 0+, considering it is never optimal for the investor












(1− e−rσ) + e−rσK
]
.








and similarly, vλ(0+) < K if c < rK. Intuitively, when s = 0+, the optimal
strategy of the firm would depend on the coupon rate c: the firm would prefer
calling the bond back in the case of a high coupon rate c ≥ rK, while would
prefer postponing the calling with a low coupon rate c < rK.
As a direct consequence of Proposition 2.5.3 and Remark 2.5.4, we simplify
ODE (2.5.6) by breaking down the discussion into three situations, which is
motivated by the results from the maximum principle.
Corollary 2.5.5 Suppose that Assumption 2.5.1 holds. Then, for s ∈ (0, s̄),
vλ(s) is the unique solution to the following ODEs:
(i) If r+λq+λqK < c < rK, then v
λ > γs, and
− L0vλ = c− λ(vλ −K)+ (2.5.9)
with the boundary condition vλ(s̄) = Lλ(s̄).
(ii) If c ≥ rK, then vλ ≥ K > γs, and
− L0vλ = c− λ(vλ −K) (2.5.10)
with the boundary condition vλ(s̄) = Lλ(s̄).
(iii) If c ≤ r+λq+λqK, then v
λ < K, and
− L0vλ = c+ λ(γs− vλ)+ (2.5.11)
with the boundary condition vλ(s̄) = Lλ(s̄).
Proof. To prove the first statement, it is sufficient to prove vλ > γs. We
first show that γs is a subsolution of (2.5.9) if r+λq+λqK < c < rK, i.e.




Together with the boundary conditions vλ(0) = cr > 0 and v




q+λK > K, it follows from the maximum principle that v
λ > γs. The
second and third statements can be obtained by the similar arguments.
Thanks to the above results, we focus our analysis to the domain s ∈ (0, s̄)
in the rest of this section. We characterize the optimal stopping strategy of
the constrained convertible bond via its associated free boundaries.
2.5.1 Case I: r+λ
q+λ
qK < c < rK
It follows from Corollary 2.5.5 that vλ > γs if r+λq+λqK < c < rK. As a direct
sequence of (2.5.8), we can conclude the optimal conversion strategy for the
investor is τ∗,λ = TM , i.e. it is never optimal for the investor to convert until
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TM . Instead, the investor’s optimal strategy is to keep the convertible bond to
receive its coupons up to TM .
Furthermore, following from (2.5.9), vλ = v1,λ solves the following ODE{
−L0vλ − c+ λ(vλ −K)+ = 0, for 0 < s < s̄;
vλ(s̄) = Lλ(s̄).
(2.5.12)
Since vλ(0+) < K, vλ(s̄) = cr+λ +
λ
q+λK > K and v
λ is increasing in s, there
must exist x1,λ ∈ (0, s̄) such that
x1,λ = inf{s ∈ (0, s̄) : v1,λ(s) ≥ K}, (2.5.13)
where by definition it is obvious that v1,λ < K for s ∈ (0, x1,λ) and v1,λ ≥ K
for s ∈ (x1,λ, s̄), and by the continuity of v1,λ that v1,λ(x1,λ) = K. In turn,
(2.5.12) is equivalent to the following free boundary problem
−L0vλ − c = 0, for 0 < s < x1,λ; (2.5.14)
−L0vλ − c+ λ(vλ −K) = 0, for x1,λ < s < s̄; (2.5.15)
vλ(s̄) = Lλ(s̄); (2.5.16)
vλ(x1,λ−) = K; (2.5.17)








The general solution of (2.5.14) has the form v1,λ(s) = A+s
α+ + A−s
α− + cr
for 0 < s ≤ x1,λ, and the general solution of (2.5.15) has the form v1,λ =
B+s
β+ +B−s
β− + c+λKr+λ for x
1,λ ≤ s < s̄, where
α± =
−(r − q − σ22 )±
√




−(r − q − σ22 )±
√
(r − q − σ22 )2 + 2(r + λ)σ2
σ2
. (2.5.21)
The boundary condition at s = 0+ and α− < 0 impliy that
v1,λ(s) =
{




β− + c+λKr+λ if s ∈ [x
1,λ, s̄)
(2.5.22)
where α = α+ in (2.5.20) and four unknowns (A1,λ, B1,λ+ , B
1,λ
− , x
1,λ) are to be
determined. Using the continuity (2.5.17)-(2.5.18) and the smooth pasting
(2.5.19) across x1,λ, and the boundary condition (2.5.16) at s = s̄, we obtain
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that x1,λ ∈ (0, s̄) is the unique solution to the following algebraic equation
C1x
β+ + C2x




















and the coefficients are determined by


















Note that the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the algebraic equation
above can be verified by the following results: f(x) = C1x
β+ +C2x
β+−β− +C3
is increasing in x with f(0) < 0 and f(s̄) > 0.
The optimal calling time for the firm is therefore given as
σ∗,λ = inf{TN ≥ T1 : SsTN ≥ x
1,λ} ∧ TM .
In Figure 2.1, we plot the value function v1,λ(s). On the one hand, it
always lies above the lower obstacle γs, which implies it is never optimal for
the investor to convert in the region s ∈ (0, s̄). On the other hand, the bond
price crosses the upper obstacle K at x1,λ ∈ (0, s̄), which thus can be regarded
as the optimal calling boundary for the firm: the firm should call the bond
back at the first Poisson time when the stock price exceeds x1,λ.
2.5.2 Case II: c ≥ rK
It follows from Corollary 2.5.5 that vλ ≥ K > γs if c ≥ rK. As a direct
sequence of (2.5.8), we can conclude the optimal conversion strategy for the
investor is τ∗,λ = TM , i.e. it is never optimal for the investor to convert until
TM . On the other hand, since the coupon rate c is too high, the firm would
prefer to convert as soon as possible to stop paying the bond coupons, i.e.
σ∗,λ = T1.
Following from (2.5.10), we further calculate the convertible bond value
vλ = v2,λ by solving the following ODE explicitly{
−L0vλ − c+ λ(vλ −K) = 0, for 0 < s < s̄;
vλ(s̄) = Lλ(s̄).
(2.5.24)


















Figure 2.1: Illustrations of the value function in Case I: r+λq+λqK < c < rK














Figure 2.2: Illustrations of the value function in Case II: c ≥ rK
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for 0 < s < s̄, where β± are given by (2.5.21). Since β− < 0, we obtain B− = 0
by the boundary condition at s = 0+. The boundary condition at s = s̄ gives








In Figure 2.2, we plot the value function v2,λ(s). The bond price always lies
above both the upper obstacle K and the lower obstacle γs, which implies that
it is always optimal for the firm to call the bond back at the first Poisson arrival
time, and never optimal for the investor to convert in the region s ∈ (0, s̄).
2.5.3 Case III: c ≤ r+λ
q+λ
qK
It follows from Corollary 2.5.5 that vλ < K if c ≤ r+λq+λqK. As a direct sequence
of (2.5.8), we can conclude the optimal calling strategy for the firm is σ∗,λ = TM ,
i.e. it is never optimal for the firm to call back the bond until TM . Instead,
the firm’s optimal strategy is to postpone the calling up to TM in light of the
low coupon rate. Furthermore, following from (2.5.11), vλ = v3,λ solves{
−L0vλ − c− λ(γs− vλ)+ = 0, for 0 < s < s̄;
vλ(s̄) = Lλ(s̄).
(2.5.26)
Next, we solve (2.5.26) explicitly. Since vλ > γs at s = 0+ and vλ ≤ γs at
s = s̄, there must exist x3,λ ∈ (0, s̄] such that
x3,λ = inf
{
s ∈ (0, s̄] : v3,λ(s) ≤ γs
}
. (2.5.27)
By definition it is obvious v3,λ > γs for s ∈ (0, x3,λ), and by the continuity of
v3,λ that v3,λ(x3,λ) = γx3,λ. Let us at the moment assume that v3,λ ≤ γs for
s ∈ (x∗,λ, s̄], which will be verified later on. If this condition holds, (2.5.26) is
equivalent to the following free boundary problem
−L0vλ − c = 0, for 0 < s < x3,λ; (2.5.28)
−L0vλ − c+ λ(vλ − γs) = 0, for x3,λ < s < s̄; (2.5.29)
vλ(s̄) = Lλ(s̄); (2.5.30)
vλ(x3,λ−) = γx3,λ; (2.5.31)

















β− + cr+λ +
λ
q+λγs, if s ∈ (x
3,λ, s̄),
(2.5.34)




are to be determined. Using the continuity (2.5.31)-(2.5.32) and the smooth
pasting (2.5.33) across x3,λ, and the boundary condition (2.5.30) at s = s̄,























and the coefficients are determined by

































It remains to verify the condition v3,λ ≤ γs for s ∈ (x3,λ, s̄]. Indeed, since
A3,λ > 0, α > 1, B3,λ+ < 0, β
+ > 1 and B3,λ− > 0, β
− < 0, it is clear that v3,λ is
convex in the interval (0, x3,λ) and concave in the interval (x3,λ, s̄]. Moreover,(
v3,λ
)′
(x3,λ) < γ, which verifies the required condition.
The optimal conversion time for the investor is therefore given by
τ∗,λ = inf{TN ≥ T1 : SsTN ≥ x
3,λ} ∧ TM .
In Figure 2.3, we plot the value function v3,λ(s). On the one hand, it always
lies below the the upper obstacle K, which implies it is never optimal for the
firm to call the bond back in the region s ∈ (0, s̄). On the other hand, the
bond price crosses the lower obstacle γs at x3,λ ∈ (0, s̄), which thus can be
regarded as the optimal conversion boundary for the bondholder: the investor
should convert the bond to stocks at the first Poisson time when the stock
price falls below x3,λ.
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Figure 2.3: Illustrations of the value function in Case III: c ≤ r+λq+λqK
2.6 Asymptotics as λ→∞
We study the asymptotic behavior of the convertible bond price and its associ-
ated free boundaries when the Poisson intensity λ→∞. Intuitively, they will
converge to their continuous time counterparts. We prove this intuition in this
section.
2.6.1 Review of standard convertible bonds
The setting is the same as in Section 2.5 except that
• both the investor and the firm choose their respective optimal stopping
strategies as F-stopping times taking values in [0, θ], and
• an automatic conversion is triggered as soon as the firm’s stock reaches a
set price s̄, i.e. the firm will force a conversion of the convertible bond to
stocks at θ rather than TM (the first Poisson arrival time following θ).











E [P (s;σ, τ)] , (2.6.2)
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where the expectation of the discount payoff
E[P (s;σ, τ)] = lim
λ→∞




+ e−rτγSsτ1{τ<θ,τ≤σ} + e
−rσK1{σ<θ,σ<τ}
]
since Lλ(s)→ γs as λ→∞, and the control set T0,θ is defined by
T0,θ = {F-stopping time τ for 0 ≤ τ ≤ θ}.
We say this game has value v if v = v = v, and has a saddle point
(σ∗, τ∗) ∈ T0,θ × T0,θ if E [P (s;σ∗, τ)] ≤ E [P (s;σ∗, τ∗)] ≤ E [P (s;σ, τ∗)] for
every (σ, τ) ∈ T0,θ × T0,θ.
The proof of the following result follows along the similar arguments in [79]
and is thus omitted. We refer to [79] for its further details.
Proposition 2.6.1 Suppose that Assumption 2.5.1 holds. Then, the value of
the standard convertible bond, denoted by v(s), exists: For s ∈ [s̄,∞), v(s) = γs;
For s ∈ (0, s̄),
(i) Case I: qK < c < rK,




with α = α+ in (2.5.20) and A1 = rK−cr (s̄)
−α, where the optimal stopping
strategy is given by σ∗ = τ∗ = θ.
(ii) Case II: c ≥ rK,
v2(s) = K, (2.6.4)
where the optimal stopping strategy is given by σ∗ = 0 and τ∗ = θ.
(iii) Case III: c ≤ qK,
v3(s) =
{
A3sα + cr , if s ∈ (0, x
3);
γs, if s ∈ [x3, s̄),
(2.6.5)




(x3)−α, and the optimal conversion
boundary x3 = min( αα−1
c
γr , s̄), where the optimal stopping strategy is given by
σ∗ = θ and τ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Sst ≥ x3}.
2.6.2 Asymptotics
We conclude the chapter by studying, when λ → ∞, (i) the convergence of
the constrained convertible bond price vλ to its continuous-time counterpart
v; (ii) the convergence of the optimal conversion/calling boundaries for the
constrained convertible bond to its continuous-time counterparts.
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In the case when c ≥ rK, it is easy to check that B2,λ → 0 and c+λKr+λ → K
by using the explicit form (2.5.25). As a consequence, we can have v2,λ(s)→
v2(s). Hence, we only need to establish the convergence results for Case I and
Case III. To this end, we first prove the limits of x1,λ in (2.5.13) and x3,λ in
(2.5.27) exist as λ goes to infinity.
Proposition 2.6.2 Suppose that Assumption 2.5.1 holds. Then, both x1,λ in
(2.5.13) and x3,λ in (2.5.27) have limits, denoted by x1∞ and x
3
∞ respectively,
as λ goes to infinity.
Proof. Since x1,λ and x3,λ are bounded by s̄, in order to prove their limits
exist, it is sufficient to prove they are increasing in λ. By the definition of x3,λ
in (2.5.27) and the explicit form of v3,λ in (2.5.34), it is sufficient to prove v3,λ
is increasing in λ.
Recall that v3,λ is the solution to the ODE (2.5.26) for s ∈ (0, s̄). Let
us suppose λ1 < λ2, define the set N =
{
s ∈ (0, s̄] : v3,λ1(s) > v3,λ2(s)
}
, and
suppose that N 6= ∅. Then on N , we have{
−L0v3,λ1 = c+ λ1(γs− v3,λ1)+;
−L0v3,λ2 = c+ λ2(γs− v3,λ2)+,
which implies{
−L0(v3,λ1 − v3,λ2) = λ1(γs− v3,λ1)+ − λ2(γs− v3,λ2)+ ≤ 0; s ∈ N
v3,λ1 − v3,λ2 = 0, s ∈ ∂N .
It follows from the maximum principle that v3,λ1 ≤ v3,λ2 on N , which is in
contradiction with the definition of N .
Similarly, we can prove v1,λ is decreasing in λ, and therefore, by the
definition of x1,λ in (2.5.13) and the explicit form of v1,λ in (2.5.22), we can
see x1,λ in (2.5.13) is also increasing in λ.
We are now in a position to establish the convergence results of x1,λ for
Case I and x3,λ for Case III. As a direct consequence, the convergence of v1,λ
to v1 and v3,λ to v3 follows immediately.
Asymptotics: Case I
In this subsection, it is sufficient to prove the unique solution x1,λ ∈ (0, s̄) to
the following algebraic equation
C1x
β+ + C2x
β+−β− + C3 = 0,
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where C1, C2, C3 are given by (2.5.23), converges to s̄ as λ→∞. By letting
y1,λ = s̄
x1,λ

















(q + λ)(r + λ)
K.



















which forces y1,λ → 1. Indeed, if we assume limλ→∞ y1,λ > 1, then the left-
hand-side of the above equation would go to infinity, which provides the desired
contradiction.
Asymptotics: Case III
In this subsection, it is sufficient to prove the unique solution x3,λ ∈ (0, s̄] to
the following algebraic equation
D1x
β+−β−+1 +D2x
β+−β− +D3x+D4 = 0,
where D1, D2, D3, D4 are given by (2.5.36), converges to x
3 as λ → ∞. By
letting y3,λ = s̄
x3,λ


























Sending λ→∞, we have
lim
λ→∞



















which implies Iλ and/or IIλ has the limit 0.














which thus forces limλ→∞ II




• If c ≥ α−1α rK, we have
lim
λ→∞








where either limλ→∞ II
λ < 0 (which implies limλ→∞ I
λ = 0) or limλ→∞ II
λ =








Risk-sensitive criteria constitute a genuinely interesting class of performance
criteria in optimization problems, in which the linear expectation E[·] is replaced
by the nonlinear expectation
Ẽ [·] := g−1(E [g(·)]),
for some strictly increasing function g as a risk-sensitive function. The cor-
responding risk-sensitive control has been developed to reflect an optimizer’s
attitudes to risks. In particular, the risk-sensitive function g is chosen to
model the optimizer’s attitudes towards risks (e.g. strict concavity of g reflects
risk-aversion of maximization players or risk-seeking of minimization players).
In this chapter, we are interested in Dynkin games with risk-sensitive
criteria, by taking into account of both players’ attitudes to risks. Namely, the
two players aim to minimize/maximize some payoff functional R(σ, τ) under
the nonlinear expectation Ẽ[·]:
J(σ, τ) = Ẽ[R (σ, τ)] = g−1 (E [g (R (σ, τ))]) ,
where σ and τ are the stopping times to be chosen by the respective minimiza-
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tion/maximization players. It is called risk-sensitive because1
J(σ, τ) ≈ E[R(σ, τ)]− 1
2
lg (E[R(σ, τ)]) Var[R(σ, τ)],
where lg(x) = −g
′′(x)
g′(x) is the Arrow-Pratt function of absolute risk aversion.
The case g(x) = x corresponds to a risk-neutral attitude of both players since
lg(x) = 0. For the case of an exponential utility g(x) = −e−γx with γ > 0,
lg(x) = γ is constant and the risk-sensitivity is only expressed through the
risk-sensitivity parameter γ.
The stopping time strategies of the two players are restricted to two
independent sequences of Poisson arrival times as the exogenous constraints
on the players’ abilities to stop. The constraints may represent liquidity
effects, indicating the times at which the underlying stochastic processes are
available to stop. Applications of such a liquidity model can be found in [58]
for bank runs and Chapter 2 for convertible bonds. The constraints can also
be seen as information constraints. The players are allowed to make their
stopping decisions at all times, but they are only able to observe the underlying
stochastic processes at Poisson arrival times. See [25] and [55] for applications
to perpetual American options. Due to the introduction of constraints on
stopping times and risk-sensitive criteria, we call the Dynkin games considered
in this chapter the constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin games.
We generalize Chapter 2 on constrained Dynkin games in two aspects:
First, it takes into consideration of both players’ attitudes towards risks via
the risk-sensitive function g; Second, there are control constraints for both
players and, moreover, the constraints are different in the sense that they
are allowed to stop at two heterogeneous sequences of Poisson arrival times.
Consequently, since the two players’ stopping time strategies are chosen from
two different sequences of signal times, the usual condition of the upper obstacle
U dominating the lower one L is not required. In Chapter 2, the risk-sensitive
function g(x) = x and both players stop at a single sequence of signal times
(so U ≥ L is assumed therein).
New challenges arise from the above generalizations. Since the two players
stop at two different sequences of Poisson arrival times, the first step to solve the
constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin game is merging the two Poisson sequences
1Here we assume enough regularity of g. We first derive a second-order Taylor approxima-
tion of g(R) at E[R], and taking the expectation for both sides gives us
E[g(R)] ≈ g(E[R]) + 1
2
g′′(E[R]) Var[R].
A first-order Taylor approximation of g−1(E[g(R)]) at g(E[R]) yields
g−1(E[g(R)]) ≈ E[R] + 1
g′(E[R])




together while still keeping track of their order. This is crucial when we
consider a family of constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin games (3.3.5)-(3.3.6)
starting from different signal times in order to apply the dynamic programming
principle. Note that the starting times of the games (3.3.5)-(3.3.6) may not be
the respective player’s own Poisson signal times; instead they could be from the
counterparty’s signal times. To deal with the nonlinear expectation Ẽ arising
from the risk-sensitive function g, we introduce a new transformation resulting
in the auxiliary payoff processes (3.2.7)-(3.2.9), which enable us to rewrite
the payoff functional under the linear expectation E instead of the nonlinear
expectation Ẽ. For a special case of exponential risk-sensitive function g (see
Section 3.5.2), the representation formula (3.2.10) of the game value is closely
related to Cole-Hopf transformation in the BSDE literature, which is widely
used to linearize a class of BSDEs with quadratic growth (see [50]). Our
representation formula (3.2.10) can be regarded as a stochastic control version
of Cole-Hopf transformation.
We also make a connection of constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin games with a
class of stochastic differential games via Krylov’s randomized stopping technique
(see [51]). It is established in [51] that standard optimal stopping problems
(without constraints on stopping times) admit stochastic control representation,
which can be further solved via the so-called normalized Bellman equations.
The stochastic control representation of the corresponding constrained optimal
stopping problems has been established in [57] (see Section 4 therein). In a
constrained stopping game setting as considered in the current chapter, it is
natural to expect that a stochastic differential game representation should hold
accordingly. Indeed, we show that the two players in the stochastic differential
game choose their respective running controls and discount rates with binary
values 0 or the Poisson intensity λi, and the optimal control is the Poisson
intensity λi whenever the value of the game falls below the lower obstacle
process/goes above the upper obstacle process.
Turing to the literature of Dynkin games, there has been a considerable
development since the seminal works of Dynkin [26] and Neveu [68]. The
continuous time models were developed, among others, by Bismut [8], Alario-
Nazaret et al [1], Lepeltier and Maingueneau [56] and Morimoto [65]. In order
to relax the dominating condition U ≥ L in those papers, Yasuda [80] proposed
the strategies of randomized stopping times, and proved that the game value
exists under merely an integrability condition. Rosemberg et al [71], Touzi
and Vielle [78] and Laraki and Solan [52] further extended his work in this
direction. The non-Markovian case was addressed in Cvitanic and Karatzas
[16] for a fixed horizon and Hamadene et al [31] for an infinite horizon using the
theory of reflected BSDEs. If the two players in the game are with asymmetric
payoffs/information, then it gives arise to a nonzero-sum Dynkin game. See, for
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example, Hamadene and Zhang [33], De Angelis et al [19] and, more recently,
De Angelis and Ekstrom [18] with more references therein. A robust version
of Dynkin games can be found in Bayraktar and Yao [5] if the players are
ambiguous about their probability model.
On the other hand, the risk-sensitive optimal stopping problems have been
studied by Nagai [67], Bäuerle and Rieder [3], Bäuerle and Popp [2] and, more
recently, Jelito et al [45]. For the risk-sensitive zero-sum and nonzero-sum
stochastic differential games, we refer to El-Karoui and Hamadène [27]. To
the best of our knowledge, the study of risk-sensitive Dynkin games is still
lacking, no matter with or without constraints on stopping time strategies. The
current chapter offers a first step to understand risk-sensitive Dynkin games,
in particular with constraints on the stopping time strategies.
The constrained optimal stopping problems was first studied by Dupuis and
Wang [25], where they used it to model perpetual American options exercised
at exogenous Poisson arrival times. See also Lempa [55], Menaldi and Robin
[61] and Hobson and Zeng [39] for further extensions of this type of optimal
stopping models. From a different perspective, Liang [57] made a connection
between such kind of optimal stopping problems with penalized BSDEs. The
corresponding optimal switching (impulse control) models were studied by
Liang and Wei [59], and by Menaldi and Robin [62] [63] with more general signal
times and state spaces. More recently, Liang and Sun (Chapter 2) introduced
the corresponding constrained Dynkin games (with the risk-sensitive function
g(x) = x), where both players were allowed to stop at a sequence of random
times generated by a single exogenous Poisson process serving as a signal
process.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 contains the problem
formulation and main result, with its proof provided in Section 3.3. In Section
3.4, we establish its connection with a class of stochastic differential games, and
in Section 3.5 we further provide two examples. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes
the chapter.
3.2 Constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin games
Let (Wt)t≥0 be a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion defined on a
filtered probability (Ω,F ,F = {Ft}t≥0,P) satisfying the usual conditions.
The probability space also supports two independent sequences of Poisson
arrival times T (1) = {T (1)n }n≥0 and T (2) = {T (2)n }n≥0 with their respective









∞ = ∞. Denote the smallest filtra-
tion generated by F and H as G = {Gt}t≥0, i.e. Gt = Ft ∨ Ht, and write
λ = (λ(1), λ(2)).
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Let T be a finite F-stopping time representing the (random) terminal
time of the game. For each player i ∈ {1, 2}, let us define a random variable
Mi : Ω 7→ N such that TMi is the next arrival time in the Poisson sequence T (i)
following T , i.e. Mi(ω) :=
∑
n≥1 n1{T in−1(ω)≤T (ω)<T in(ω)}
.
For any integer n ≥ 0, we define the control set for each player i ∈ {1, 2} as
R(i)n = {G-stopping time σ for σ(ω) = T
(i)
N (ω) where n ≤ N ≤Mi(ω)},
(3.2.1)
so the player i chooses from the Poisson arrival times T (i) with intensity λ(i),
and T
(i)
n is the smallest stopping time allowed.
Consider a constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin game, where the two players
choose their respective stopping times σ ∈ R(1)1 and τ ∈ R
(2)
1 in order to
minimize/maximize the expected cost functional
J(σ, τ) = Ẽ [R(σ, τ)] , (3.2.2)
where the nonlinear expectation Ẽ : R → R is defined via the risk-sensitive
function g, i.e.
Ẽ [·] := g−1 (E [g (·)]) . (3.2.3)





−rT ξ1{σ∧τ≥T} + e
−rτLτ1{τ<T,τ≤σ}
+ e−rσUσ1{σ<T,σ<τ}, (3.2.4)
where r > 0 is the discount rate, and f , as a real-valued F-progressively
measurable process, is the running payoff. The terminal payoff is U if σ
happens firstly, L if τ happens firstly or σ and τ happen simultaneously, and
ξ otherwise, where L and U are two real-valued F-progressively measurable
processes, and ξ is a real-valued FT -measurable random variable.











The game (3.2.5) is said to have value vλ if vλ = vλ = vλ, and a saddle point
(σ∗, τ∗) ∈ R(1)1 ×R
(2)
1 is called an optimal stopping strategy of the game if
J(σ∗, τ) ≤ J(σ∗, τ∗) ≤ J(σ, τ∗),




Compared with the constrained Dynkin game introduced in Chapter 2,
there are two new features of the game (3.2.5): First, it takes into consideration
of the both players’ attitudes towards risks via the risk-sensitive function
g; Second, there are control constraints for both players and, moreover, the
constraints are different in the sense that they are allowed to stop at two
heterogeneous sequences of Poisson arrival times. As a consequence, since the
two players’ stopping time strategies are chosen from two different control
sets, the usual dominating condition U ≥ L is not required. In Chapter 2, the
risk-sensitive function g(x) = x and both players stop at a single sequence of
Poisson arrival times (so U ≥ L is a critical assumption therein).
3.2.1 Main result of this chapter
To solve the above constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin game, we introduce the
characterizing BSDE on a random horizon [0, T ]:
Q
λ








































respectively. And also we set Q
λ
t ≡ ξ for t ≥ T . Moreover, we introduce the
following spaces: for any given α ∈ R and n ∈ N,


























H2,n and S2,n for the ease of notation.
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We impose the following assumptions on the risk-sensitive function g, the
running payoff f and the terminal payoffs L, U and ξ in terms of the auxiliary
payoffs L, U and ξ.
Assumption 3.2.1 The deterministic risk-sensitive function g : R → R is
strictly increasing and, moreover, (i) when T is an unbounded stopping time,
L, U and ξ are all bounded; (ii) when T is a bounded stopping time, L ∈ S2,1,
U ∈ S2,1 and ξ ∈ L2,1, where L, U and ξ are given by (3.2.7), (3.2.8) and
(3.2.9), respectively.
On the one hand, since the two players’ control sets are different, the usual
dominating condition U ≥ L is not required. On the other hand, the conditions
(i) and (ii) in Assumption 3.2.1 guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the
solution to BSDE (3.2.6), which will in turn be used to construct the game
value and its associated optimal stopping strategy. Under Assumption 3.2.1,
the solvability of BSDE (3.2.6) follows from Theorem 3.3 in [12] (when T is
unbounded) and Theorem 4.1 in [69] (when T is bounded), and thus we omit
the proof of the following proposition and refer to [12] and [69] for the details.
Proposition 3.2.2 Suppose that Assumption 3.2.1 holds. Then, there exists




) to BSDE (3.2.6). Moreover, (i) when T is an
unbounded stopping time, Q
λ











We are now in a position to state the main result of this chapter.












e−r(u−t∧T )fu du, (3.2.10)
for t ≥ 0. Then, the value of the constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin game (3.2.5)
exists and is given by
vλ = vλ = vλ = Qλ0 .
Moreover, the optimal stopping strategy of the game is given by σ











} ∧ T (1)M1 ;











} ∧ T (2)M2 .
Remark 3.2.4 For a special case of exponential risk-sensitive function g
(see Section 3.5.2), the representation formula (3.2.10) is closely related to
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Cole-Hopf transformation in the BSDE literature, which is widely used to
linearize a class of BSDEs with quadratic growth (see [50]). Our representation
formula (3.2.10) can be regarded as a stochastic control version of Cole-Hopf
transformation.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 3.2.3
Since the two players stop at two different sequences of Poisson arrival times,
the first step to prove Theorem 3.2.3 is merging the two Poisson sequences
together while still keeping track of their order. To this end, for each T (1) and




















1 1{T (1)1 >θ1}
+ T
(1)
2 1{T (1)1 ≤θ1}
, T
(2)
1 1{T (2)1 >θ1}
+ T
(2)







1 1{T (1)1 >θ2}
+ T
(1)
3 1{T (1)1 ≤θ2}
, T
(1)
2 1{T (1)2 >θ2}
+ T
(1)




1 1{T (2)1 >θ2}
+ T
(2)
3 1{T (2)1 ≤θ2}
, T
(2)
2 1{T (2)2 >θ2}
+ T
(2)
3 1{T (2)2 ≤θ2}
)
,





1 1{T (1)1 >θk−1}
+ T
(1)
k 1{T (1)1 ≤θk−1}







1 1{T (2)1 >θk−1}
+ T
(2)
k 1{T (2)1 ≤θk−1}






· · · .
In Figure 3.1, we illustrate the construction of the merged sequence θ, where
the top and the middle line are a realization of T (1) and T (2), and the bottom
line is the merged sequence θ. Intuitively, given any G-stopping time θk−1,
k ≥ 1, (to be used as the starting times for a family of constrained Dynkin
games (3.3.5)-(3.3.6) below), we find the first arrival time of each Poisson


















Gs : A ∩ {θk ≤ s} ∈ Gs for s ≥ 0
 ,
and G̃ = {Gθk}k≥0.
Next, we tackle the nonlinear expectation Ẽ associated with the risk-
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Figure 3.1: An illustration of a merged Poisson arrival sequence θ.















and rewrite the discounted payoff functional R(σ, τ) as
R̃(σ, τ) = ξ̃1{σ∧τ≥T} + L̃τ1{τ<T,τ≤σ} + Ũσ1{σ<T,σ<τ} = R(σ, τ). (3.3.4)
In turn, consider a family of constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin games starting
from θk−1, for k ≥ 1, whose upper and lower values are defined by























G-stopping time σ for σ(ω) = T
(i)
N (ω) where T
(i)




Remark 3.3.1 Note that in the above definition of control set R̃(i)θk , θk is not
necessary from the Poisson sequence T (i), so R̃(i)θk is in general different from




On the other hand, thanks to the introduction of the discounted processes
L̃, Ũ and ξ̃ in (3.3.1)-(3.3.3), the payoff functional in (3.3.4) can be divided
into three disjoint sets and the risk-sensitive function g can be applied to each
of them separately. Thus, we can rewrite the payoff in (3.3.5)-(3.3.6) under
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the linear expectation E of the auxiliary payoff processes L, U and ξ as
Ẽ
[









This motivates us to introduce the Cole-Hopf representation formula (3.2.10).
The constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin game (3.3.5)-(3.3.6) is said to have
value qλθk−1 if q
λ
θk−1
= qλθk−1 = q
λ
θk−1
, and (σ∗k, τ
∗
k ) ∈ R̃
(1)
θk
× R̃(2)θk is called an
















for every (σ, τ) ∈ R̃(1)θk × R̃
(2)
θk
. In particular, when k = 1, (3.3.5)-(3.3.6)
corresponds to the original constrained Dynkin game (3.2.5). Thus, to prove
















} ∧ T (1)M1 ,
τ∗k = inf{T
(2)





} ∧ T (2)M2 ,
(3.3.8)







being the first component of the solution to BSDE (3.2.6). In turn,












e−r(u−T )fudu = ξ.
Remark 3.3.2 For the reader’s convenience, we recall the notations that
have been introduced thus far. For the payoff processes h = L,U, ξ, we have




−rufu du, and auxiliary payoff
processes ht = e
rtg(h̃t). In terms of the value process Q





−rufu du, and Q
λ
t = e
rtg(Q̃λt ), for t ∈ [0, T ].
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To prove the above assertions (and therefore Theorem 3.2.3), we start with
the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3.3 Suppose that Assumption 3.2.1 holds. Then, Q̃λθk−1 given in


















for k ≥ 1.














where g(ξ̃) = e−rT ξ, g(L̃t) = e
−rtLt and g(Ũt) = e
−rtU t. For k such that
θk−1 > T , it follows from (3.3.9) that g(Q̃
λ
θk−1
) = g(ξ̃), and thus (3.3.12) holds.
In the rest of the proof, we only focus on the cases where θk−1 ≤ T .
By applying Itô’s formula to αtg(Q̃
λ

















































for t ≥ 0. By choosing t = θk−1 and taking the conditional expectation with

























for any k ≥ 1.
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On the other hand, by defining T̃
(i)
t as the first arrival time in T
(i) following








N > t}, we can rewrite the























































































(2)(U−θk−1) dS dU︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II)
∣∣∣∣Gθk−1],




















































































































It follows from (3.3.13), (3.3.15), (3.3.16) and (3.3.17) that (3.3.12) holds
for any k ≥ 1. Hence, Qλθk−1 , which is given by (3.3.9), satisfies the recursive
equation (3.3.11), for k ≥ 1.














where Q̃λθk−1 is given by (3.3.9), satisfies the recursive equation












for k ≥ 1.
We will show that Q̂λθk−1 in (3.3.18) is actually the unique solution of the
recursive equation (3.3.19). The uniqueness is proved by showing that Q̂λθk−1 is
the value of an auxiliary constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin game starting from
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where the payoff functional R̃(σ, τ) is given by (3.3.4) and the control set R̃(i)θk−1
is given by (3.3.7).














× R̃(2)θk−1 is called an optimal stopping




















The difference between (3.3.20)-(3.3.21) and (3.3.5)-(3.3.6) is that the
players first make their stopping decisions and then move forward in the former
game, while in the latter game they first move forward and then make their
decisions.
Lemma 3.3.4 Suppose that Assumption 3.2.1 holds. Then, for any k ≥ 1, the
value of the auxiliary constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin game (3.3.20)-(3.3.21)
starting from θk−1 exists. Its value q̂
λ
θk−1
is the unique solution of the recursive
equation (3.3.19). Hence, q̂λθk−1 = Q̂
λ
θk−1
, where the latter is given by (3.3.18).
The optimal stopping strategy of the auxiliary constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin









} ∧ T (1)M1 ;
τ̂∗k−1 = inf{T
(2)





} ∧ T (2)M2 .
(3.3.22)
Proof. Step 1. Let Q̂λθk−1 be a solution of the recursive equation (3.3.19)





















is a G̃-submartingale under Ẽ, for any σ ∈ R̃(1)θk−1 .















and the definition of (σ̂∗k−1, τ̂
∗













































Using the similar arguments, if the supermartingale property (ii) and the







































It follows from (3.3.24) and (3.3.25) that










































, and therefore the value of the auxiliary constrained










This also implies the recursive equation (3.3.19) admits a unique solution.
Furthermore, since Q̂λθk−1 given by (3.3.18) satisfies the recursive equation
(3.3.19), it is actually the unique solution of (3.3.19). As a direct consequence
of (3.3.23)-(3.3.25), we can obtain that (σ̂∗k−1, τ̂
∗
k−1), which is given by (3.3.22),
is indeed an optimal stopping strategy of the auxiliary constrained risk-sensitive
Dynkin game (3.3.20)-(3.3.21).
Step 2. It remains to prove the martingale property (i), the supermartingale
property (ii) and the submartingale property (iii) in Step 1.

















































where the second last equality follows from the definition (3.3.22) of (σ̂∗k−1, τ̂
∗
k−1),
and thus the martingale property (i) has been proved.


































which proves the supermartingale property (ii). Likewise, the submartingale
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property (iii) can be proved in a similar way, and the proof of this lemma is
thus completed.
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 3.2.3. Let Q̃λθk−1 be a solution
















































Using the relationship {θk ≥ T} ⊆ {σ̂∗k ∧ τ̂∗k ≥ T}, {τ̂∗k < T, τ̂∗k ≤ σ̂∗k} ⊆ {θk <






























k ) is the optimal stopping strategy of the auxiliary constrained
risk-sensitive Dynkin game starting from θk given in (3.3.22). Similarly, we












It follows from (3.3.27) and (3.3.28) that


































It is clear that qλθk−1 ≥ q
λ
θk−1
, and therefore the value of the constrained








This also implies the recursive equation (3.3.11) admits a unique solution.
Furthermore, since Q̃λθk−1 given by (3.3.9) satisfies the recursive equation
(3.3.11), it is actually the unique solution of (3.3.11). As a direct consequence
of (3.3.26)-(3.3.28), we can obtain that (σ̂∗k, τ̂
∗
k ), which is given by (3.3.22), is
indeed an optimal stopping strategy of the constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin
game (3.3.5)-(3.3.6).
We conclude the proof by proving (σ̂∗k, τ̂
∗

















} ∧ T (1)M1









} ∧ T (1)M1 = σ
∗
k,
and, similarly, τ̂∗k = τ
∗
k .
3.4 Connection with stochastic differential games
via randomized stopping
In this section, we connect constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin games with a class
of stochastic differential games via randomized stopping first introduced by
Krylov (see [51]). In particular, we generalize the optimal control representation
of constrained optimal stopping problems in [57] (see Section 4 therein).
Let us introduce the basic idea of randomized stopping in a two-player
setting as follows. Consider a nonnegative control process (at)t≥0 (resp. (bt)t≥0),
and let Player I (resp. II) stop with probability
P(τ ≤ t+ ∆|τ > t) = 1− e−
∫ t+∆
t as ds ≈ at∆
(resp.
P(τ ≤ t+ ∆|τ > t) = 1− e−
∫ t+∆
t bs ds ≈ bt∆)
in an infinitesimal interval (t, t+ ∆). Then the probability that Player I (resp.










and the probability that both players do not stop before time t and Player I
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Recall that T is a finite F-stopping time representing the (random) terminal
time of the game, and r > 0 represents the discount rate. The discounted
payoff is assumed to be e−rtU t if Player I stops firstly at time t < T , e
−rtLt
if Player II stops firstly at time t < T , and e−rT ξ if neither players stop in
the time interval [0, T ], where the auxiliary payoff processes U , L and ξ are
given in (3.2.8), (3.2.7), and (3.2.9), respectively. Thus, the discounted payoff






































We define the control set A(λ(1)) (resp. B(λ(2))) for Player I (resp. II) as
A(λ(1)) = {F-adapted process (at)t≥0 : at = 0 or λ(1)}
(resp.
B(λ(2)) = {F-adapted process (bt)t≥0 : bt = 0 or λ(2)}),










g−1 (E[J(a, b)]) , (3.4.2)
where g−1 is the inverse function of the risk-sensitive function g. The game
(3.4.1)-(3.4.2) is said to have value vλ,SDG if vλ,SDG = vλ,SDG = vλ,SDG,
and (a∗, b∗) ∈ A(λ(1)) × B(λ(2)) is said to be an optimal pair of controls if
vλ,SDG = g−1 (E[J(a∗, b∗)]).
We are now in a position to present the main result of this section.





unique solution to BSDE (3.2.6). Then, the value of the stochastic differential
game (3.4.1)-(3.4.2) exists and equals the value vλ of the constrained risk-
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sensitive Dynkin game (3.2.5), i.e.















for t ≥ 0.
Proof. Following the similar arguments to the proof of Lemma 3.3.3,
it can be shown that, for any pair of controls (a, b) ∈ A(λ(1)) × B(λ(2)),
E[J(a, b)] = V λ0 (a, b), where the latter is the first component of the unique
solution to the following BSDE with a random terminal time T :










Zλu (a, b) dWu,
for t ≥ 0. On the other hand, recall that Qλ is the first component of the
solution to BSDE (3.2.6):
Q
λ






































holds for any control a ∈ A(λ(1)), and thus, the BSDE comparison result (see
Corollary 4.4.2 in [17]) yields that
Q
λ
t∧T ≤ V λt∧T (a, b∗), (3.4.5)




t∧T ≥ V λt∧T (a∗, b), (3.4.6)








































≥ vλ,SDG. Hence, it follows from
vλ,SDG ≥ vλ,SDG that (3.4.3) holds. As a direct consequence of (3.4.5)-(3.4.7),
we can obtain (a∗, b∗) in (3.4.4) is an optimal pair of controls.
3.5 Examples
3.5.1 Example I: Constrained risk-neutral Dynkin games
As the first example, we take the risk-sensitive function to be g(x) = x. This
means both players are risk neutral and, therefore, the corresponding games are
called constrained risk-neutral Dynkin games. In this case, the cost functional
in (3.2.2) is evaluated under the linear expectation E:
Ẽ [R(σ, τ)] = E [R(σ, τ)]
with the payoff functional R(σ, τ) given by (3.2.4). Hence, the upper and lower











The game (3.5.1) is said to have value vλ,RN if vλ,RN = vλ,RN = vλ,RN , and
(σ∗,RN , τ∗,RN ) ∈ R(1)1 ×R
(2)




























) is the unique solution to the characterizing BSDE
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(3.2.6). Thus, we deduce the so-called penalized BSDE with double obstacles
on a random horizon [0, T ] (see [16] for the case of a fixed terminal time T ),





















and Qλt = ξ −
∫ T
0 e
−r(u−T )fu du = ξ for t ≥ T .
Assumption 3.5.1 The risk-sensitive function g(x) = x. Moreover, (i) when
T is an unbounded stopping time, f , L, U and ξ are all bounded; (ii) when T
is a bounded stopping time, f ∈ H2,1, L ∈ S2,1, U ∈ S2,1 and ξ ∈ L2,1.
Note that the above assumption implies Assumption 3.2.1 and, therefore,
it follows from Theorem 3.2.3 that BSDE (3.5.2) admits a unique solution
(Qλ, Z
λ
). Moreover, the value of the constrained risk-neutral Dynkin game
(3.5.1) exists and is given by
vλ,RN = vλ,RN = vλ,RN = Qλ0 .
The optimal stopping strategy is given by σ











} ∧ T (1)M1 ;











} ∧ T (2)M2 .
Remark 3.5.2 The special case g(x) = x generalizes the results obtained in
[57] and Chapter 2. To be more specific, when λ(1) = 0 (resp. λ(2) = 0), Player
I (resp. II) is with a zero intensity control set and is never allowed to stop,
so the value of the constrained risk-neutral Dynkin game (3.5.1) equals the
value of the one-player optimal stopping problem with Poisson intervention
times introduced in [57]. On the other hand, when the two intensities coincide,
i.e. λ(1) = λ(2), the value of the constrained risk-neutral Dynkin game (3.5.1)
equals the value of the Dynkin game with Poisson intervention times introduced
in Chapter 2 (i.e. the game (2.2.2)-(2.2.3) introduced in Section 2.2).
3.5.2 Example II: Constrained Dynkin games with exponential
utility
The second example for the risk-sensitive function g is an exponential utility:
g(x) = −e−γx for γ > 0. In this case, the cost functional in (3.2.2) becomes




with the payoff functional R(σ, τ) given by (3.2.4). Hence, the upper and lower















The game (3.5.3)-(3.5.4) is said to have value vλ,EU if vλ,EU = vλ,EU = vλ,EU ,
and (σ∗,EU , τ∗,EU ) ∈ R(1)1 ×R
(2)





















er(t∧T ) ln(−e−r(t∧T )Qλt )−
∫ t∧T
0
e−r(u−t∧T )fu du (3.5.5)




) is the unique solution to the characterizing BSDE
(3.2.6). By applying Itô’s lemma to Qλt in (3.5.5), we can deduce the following
BSDE with quadratic growth on a random horizon [0, T ] (see [50] for the case
of a fixed maturity T ):

































e−r(u−T )fu du = ξ
for t ≥ T . Note that Qλt < 0 for t ∈ [0, T ], and therefore Zλt is well-defined.
Indeed, L,U < 0 by the construction of the risk-sensitive function g(x) =








)+ − r · 0 ≤ 0.
for t ∈ [0, T ]. Given the terminal condition ξ < 0 by construction, it follows
from standard comparison results that Q
λ
t < 0 holds for t ∈ [0, T ].
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Assumption 3.5.3 The risk-sensitive function g(x) = −e−γx for γ > 0, and
f , L, U and ξ are all bounded.
Note that the above assumption implies Assumption 3.2.1 and, therefore,
it follows from Theorem 3.2.3 that BSDE (3.5.6) admits a unique solution
(Qλ, Zλ). Moreover, the value of the constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin game
(3.5.3)-(3.5.4) exists and is given by
vλ,EU = vλ,EU = vλ,EU = Qλ0 .
The optimal stopping strategy is given by σ











} ∧ T (1)M1 ;











} ∧ T (2)M2 .
3.6 Conclusion and future work
In this chapter, we have solved a new class of Dynkin games with a general
risk-sensitive criterion function g and two heterogenous Poisson arrival times
as the permitted stopping time strategies for the two players. Moreover, we
have made a connection with a class of stochastic differential games via the
so-called randomized stopping technique.
The approach and the results herein may be extended in various directions.
First, one may consider stochastic intensity models, an undoubtedly important
case since the two players’ signal times may affect each other’s intensities. For
example, for i ∈ {1, 2}, if the player i’s first signal time T (i)1 occurs, it will have














for some constants λ(i), λ
(i)
such that the process (λ
(i)
t )t≥0 is always nonnegative.
However, various nontrivial technical difficulties arise. In particular, the
resulting characterizing BSDEs will become a family of recursive equations,
whose solvability is far from clear yet.
Second, one may consider that the two players have different attitudes
towards risks and are associated with different information sets. For example,
one player is risk-neutral with g(1)(x) = x and the other has an exponential
utility with g(2)(x) = −e−γx. This leads to heterogenous payoff functionals and,
therefore a nonzero-sum constrained Dynkin game arises. The corresponding
characterizing equations will become a BSDE system. Both extensions will be







Optimal switching is a generalisation of optimal stopping, where one or more
agents determine their optimal sequence of times to switch a system’s opera-
tional modes. Optimal switching has various applications in economics and
finance, in particular for real options (see, for example, Brekke and Øksendal
[10] and Duckworth and Zervos [24]). In the literature, there are mainly two
ways to solve optimal switching problems: either an analytical one using PDE
(see, for example, Bensoussan and Lions [6] and Tang and Yong [76]) and
a probabilistic one using martingale approach and BSDE (see, for example,
Djehiche et al [23] and Hu and Tang [42]).
Unlike single-player optimisation problems, which all of the aforementioned
references are concerned with, multiple-player optimal switching games did not
attract much interest in the literature. Two-player zero-sum optimal switching
games with strictly positive switching costs for deterministic systems were
first considered and solved by Yong ([81] in a finite horizon case and [82]
in an infinite horizon case) using a viscosity solution approach. Tang and
Hou [77] formulated and solved a similar game in a stochastic setting. Hu
and Tang [43] proved the existence of the solution to a system of reflected
BSDEs with interconnected obstacles, which were claimed to be associated to
two-player zero-sum optimal switching games. In the case when the running
and terminal rewards are separated (see (4.5.4)), Djehiche et al [22] made a
connection between the game value and the system of reflected BSDEs with
interconnected obstacles. To the best of our knowledge, the existence of the
value of a two-player zero-sum optimal switching game, without additional
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conditions on the running and terminal rewards (for example, (4.5.4)), is still
an open question.
In this chapter, we consider a new type of two-player zero-sum optimal
switching games, where two players are only allowed to switch at two hetero-
geneous exogenous sequences of Poisson arrival times. We call this kind of
optimal switching games as constrained optimal switching games.
Our main result is Theorem 4.2.5, providing the chain of inequalities (4.2.8)
involving the lower and upper static values (4.2.4), the lower and upper dynamic
values (4.2.5) of constrained optimal switching games and the solution of a
BSDE system, where the latter can be regarded as a “penalized version” of
a system of reflected BSDEs with interconnected obstacles. The basic idea
comes from the Dynkin game representation for one dimensional penalized
BSDEs (see Section 4.4.2). Under some additional conditions on the running
and terminal rewards, as imposed in [22], we show the value of constrained
optimal switching games exists and equals the solution of the above BSDE
system, and establish its connection with constrained single-player optimal
switching problems.
Finally at the end of this chapter, we study the duopolistic competition in
resource extraction when the resource price follows a one-dimensional geometric
Brownian motion. Both producers are allowed to either open a field for
producing at most a given amount of resource or close down a field at Poisson
arrival times, aiming to maximise/minimise the difference of their expected
profits. This creates a constrained optimal switching game, whose structure
of switching regions can be fully described. The problem we solve is closely
related with the classical model imposed by Brekke and Øksendal [10].
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 contains the problem
formulation and main result on the chain of inequalities involving the game
values and the solution of a BSDE system, whose solvability is proved in Section
4.3. Section 4.4 provides the proof of the main result. In Section 4.5, under
some additional conditions on the running and terminal rewards, we show the
game has a value and establish a connection with constrained single-player
optimal switching problems. In Section 4.6, we apply the constrained optimal
switching games to study the duopolistic competition in resource extraction,
and give a complete description of the structure of switching regions.
4.2 Constrained optimal switching games
Let (Wt)t≥0 be a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion defined on a filtered
probability (Ω,F ,F = {Ft}t≥0,P) satisfying the usual conditions. Let T (1) =
{T (1)n }n≥0 and T (2) = {T (2)n }n≥0 be two sequences of the arrival times of
independent Poisson processes with intensities λ(1) > 0 and λ(2) > 0, and
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minimal augmented filtration Hλ = {Hλt }t≥0 given the parameter pair λ =
(λ(1), λ(2)). Denote the smallest filtrations generated by F and Hλ as Gλ =









∞ =∞. Moreover, for each player k ∈ {1, 2},
given the stopping time T
(k)










Gs : A ∩ {T (k)n ≤ s} ∈ Gs for s ≥ 0

for n ≥ 0. Let T ∈ [0,+∞] be a fixed horizon, representing the terminal time
of the game.
Let Λk := {1, · · · ,mk} denote the set of switching modes for each player
k ∈ {1, 2}, and Λ = Λ1 × Λ2 with cardinality |Λ| = m = m1 ×m2. Given m1
(resp. m2) switching modes, player I (resp. II) starts in mode i ∈ Λ1 at time
0, and makes his (resp. her) switching decisions sequentially at a sequence of
Poisson arrival times T (1) (resp. T (2)) until the terminal time T of the game.
Let us define individual admissible switching controls for both players as
follows.
Definition 4.2.1 An admissible switching control for Player I (resp. II) is
defined to be a pair of sequences α = (σn, an)n≥0 (resp. β = (τn, bn)n≥0) such
that
1. for all n ≥ 0, σn ∈ T (1) such that σn < σn+1 P-a.s. (resp. τn ∈ T (2)
with τn < τn+1 P-a.s.),
2. for all n ≥ 0, an is a Gλσn-measurable Λ
1-valued random variable (resp.
bn is a Gλτn-measurable Λ
2-valued random variable),
3. for all n ≥ 1, on {σn < T} we have an 6= an−1 while on {σn ≥ T} we
have an = an−1 (resp. on {τn < T} we have bn 6= bn−1 while on {τn ≥ T}
we have bn = bn−1).
Let A (resp. B) denote the set of controls for player I (resp. II), and Ai (resp.
Bj) denote the set of controls α ∈ A (resp. β ∈ B) satisfying σ0 = 0 and
a0 = i ∈ Λ1 (resp. τ0 = 0 and b0 = j ∈ Λ2).
His (resp. her) switching decision at any time t ≥ 0 can be represented as











Let (i, j) ∈ Λ be the initial state and consider the following static version
of constrained optimal switching game, where player I and II choose their
respective admissible switching controls α ∈ Ai and β ∈ Bj in order to
minimise/maximise the following payoff









e−rτn lbn−1,bnτn − e
−rσnkan−1,anσn
)
+ e−rTha(T ),b(T )1{T<∞}
]
(4.2.3)
where r > 0 is the discount rate. For (i, j) ∈ Λ, f i,j defines a running reward
paid by player I to player II and hi,j defines a terminal reward paid by player
I to player II, when the active modes of both players are i and j respectively.
For i1, i2 ∈ Λ1, ki1,i2 defines a payment from player I to player II when the
former switches from mode i1 to i2. For j1, j2 ∈ Λ2, lj1,j2 defines a payment
from player II to player I when the former switches from mode j1 to j2.
For the initial state (i, j) ∈ Λ, let us define the lower and upper values for










and the static game (4.2.4) is said to have a value vi,j if vi,j = vi,j = vi,j . We
call vi,j and vi,j as the lower static value and upper static value, respectively.
Clearly, on vi,j (resp. vi,j), player I (resp. II), the minimizer (resp. the
maximizer), is given an advantage over player II (resp. I) because he is able to
look at the other player’s control before choosing his own.
4.2.2 Dynamic version
Both vi,j and vi,j are called static because on each of them, one of the players
is given advantage by being allowed to know the control of the other player
for the entire duration of the game, i.e. [0, T ]. In static games, clearly some
information about the future is being revealed to the player with advantage.
This motivates us to introduce a dynamic version of constrained optimal
switching game, where no information about the future is revealed. One of
the players will be given a limited advantage in the sense that the information
about the other player’s control is revealed in a dynamic way, as time goes by.
This is achieved by introducing non-anticipating strategies for both players.
Before that, we first define equivalent admissible controls. Let 0 ≤ t ≤
s ≤ T , two controls α1, α2 ∈ A (resp. β1, β2 ∈ B) with α1 = (σ1n, a1n)n≥0 and
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α2 = (σ2n, a
2
n)n≥0 (resp. β
1 = (τ1n, b
1
n)n≥0 and β
2 = (τ2n, b
2
n)n≥0) are said to be




















for u ∈ [t, s] P-a.s..
Definition 4.2.2 A non-anticipative strategy for player I (resp. II) is a
mapping α : B → A (resp. β : A→ B) such that if β1 ≡ β2 (resp. α1 ≡ α2)
on [t, s], we have α(β1) ≡ α(β2) (resp. β(α1) ≡ β(α2)) on [t, s]. Let A (resp.
B) denote the set of non-anticipative strategies for player I (resp. II), and Ai
(resp. Bj) denote the set of non-anticipative strategies α ∈ A (resp. β ∈ B)
satisfying σ0 = 0 and a0 = i ∈ Λ1 (resp. τ0 = 0 and b0 = j ∈ Λ2).
For the initial state (i, j) ∈ Λ, let us define the lower and upper values for
the dynamic game as follows











and the dynamic game (4.2.5) is said to have a value V i,j if V i,j = V i,j = V
i,j
.
We call V i,j and V
i,j
as the lower dynamic value and upper dynamic value,
respectively.
4.2.3 Main result of this chapter
To solve the above constrained optimal switching games (4.2.4) and (4.2.5), we
introduce the following BSDE system defined on [0, T ]:






f i,js + λ
(2)
(
Li,js − Y i,js







for t ∈ [0, T ] and (i, j) ∈ Λ, where
Li,js := max
j′ 6=j
{Y i,j′s − lj,j
′
s } and U i,js := min
i′ 6=i
{Y i′,js + ki,i
′
s }. (4.2.7)
For later use, let us introduce the following spaces: for any given α ∈ R
and n, n̄ ∈ N,
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H2,n×n̄ and S2,n for the ease of notation.
In order to solve (4.2.6), we impose the following assumptions on the
running reward function f , the terminal reward function h and the switching
cost functions k and l.
Assumption 4.2.3 1. For i ∈ Λ1 and j ∈ Λ2, ki,it = 0 and l
j,j
t = 0 P-a.s.
for t ≥ 0.
2. For (i, j) ∈ Λ, i1, i2 ∈ Λ1 and j1, j2 ∈ Λ2, (i) when T = ∞, f i,j , ki1,i2
and lj1,j2 are all bounded; (ii) when T < ∞, f i,j ∈ H2,1, hi,j ∈ L2,1,
ki1,i2 ∈ S2,1 and lj1,j2 ∈ S2,1.
The last condition is to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the
solution to BSDE system (4.2.6), which will be used to construct the game
values and associated optimal switching strategies.
Proposition 4.2.4 Suppose that Assumption 4.2.3 holds. Then there exists a
unique solution (Y, Z) to BSDE system (4.2.6). Moreover, (i) when T =∞, Y
is bounded and Z ∈ H2,m×d−r ; (ii) when T <∞, (Y,Z) ∈ S2,m ×H2,m×d.
Under Assumption 4.2.3, the solvability of BSDE system (4.2.6) on a finite
horizon essentially follows from Theorem 3.3 in [69], and thus we omit its proof
and refer to [69] for the details. We only provide the proof of Proposition 4.2.4
on an infinite horizon in the next section.
We are now in a position to present the main result of this chapter.
Theorem 4.2.5 Suppose that Assumption 4.2.3 holds. Let (Y,Z) be the unique
solution to BSDE system (4.2.6). For every initial state (i, j) ∈ Λ, the following
chain of inequalities hold:
vi,j ≥ V i,j ≥ Y i,j0 ≥ V
i,j ≥ vi,j , (4.2.8)
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and moreover, there exists a pair of controls (α∗, β∗) ∈ Ai × Bj and non-
anticipative strategies α∗ ∈ Ai and β∗ ∈ Bj such that
Y i,j0 = J(α
∗, β∗) = sup
β∈Bj
J(α∗(β), β) = inf
α∈Ai
J(α, β∗(α)).
Remark 4.2.6 Note that the admissible switching controls α∗, β∗ and non-
anticipative strategies α∗, β∗ are related by α∗ = α∗(β∗) and β∗ = β∗(α∗).
When Player II uses the non-anticipative strategy β∗, then α∗ by Player I gives
the minimum possible value for the upper dynamic game over all controls α.
Symmetrically, when Player I uses the non-anticipative strategy α∗, then β∗ by
Player II gives the maximum possible value for the lower dynamic game over all
controls β. In Section 4.5, we will show that, under some additional conditions
on the running and terminal rewards, (α∗, β∗) is indeed a Nash equilibrium in
this constrained optimal switching game.
4.3 Proof of Proposition 4.2.4 on an infinite horizon
The proof is based on the multidimensional comparison result, which was first
established by Hu and Peng [41]. In this section, we use a slightly different
but more general version, which was provided by Hu et al [40]. We omit the
proof of the following lemma and refer to [40] for the details.
Lemma 4.3.1 Let deterministic terminal time T > 0 be fixed. Consider a
system of BSDE(ξi,j , Gi,j) with the terminal data ξi,j and the driver Gi,j:













Y −i,−js := (Y
1,1











1. ξi,j , ξ
i,j ∈ L2,1 and satisfying ξi,j ≤ ξi,j for (i, j) ∈ Λ;
2. Gi,js (yi,j , y−i,−j) is Lipschitz continuous in y = (yi,j , y−i,−j) for (i, j) ∈ Λ,
and nondecreasing in yi
′,j′ for (i′, j′) ∈ Λ\{(i, j)};











(i, j) ∈ Λ.
Then, Y i,jt ≤ Y
i,j
t for t ∈ [0, T ] and (i, j) ∈ Λ.
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The idea of the proof of Proposition 4.2.4 is as follows. We construct a
solution to BSDE system (4.2.6) by following an approximation procedure.








f i,js + λ
(2)
(












for t ∈ [0,m], and Y i,j,(m)t = Z
i,j,(m)
t ≡ 0 for t > m, where
Li,j,(m)s := max
j′ 6=j
{Y i,j′,(m)s − lj,j
′
s } and U i,j,(m)s := min
i′ 6=i
{Y i′,j,(m)s + ki,i
′
s }.
Note that (4.3.1) is a finite horizon BSDE system with Lipschitz continuous
driver, so it admits a unique solution (Y i,j,(m), Zi,j,(m))(i,j)∈Λ. We will show
the pair of processes (Y i,j,(m), Zi,j,(m))m≥1 form a Cauchy sequence in an
appropriate space, whose limit provides a solution to the infinite horizon BSDE
system (4.2.6). Moreover, the uniqueness of the solution follows from the
comparison result in Lemma 4.3.1.
We are now in a position to prove Proposition 4.2.4 in the infinite horizon
case.
Step 1. A priori estimate: We show that (Y i,j,(m))(i,j)∈Λ, which is the first
component of the solution to the finite horizon BSDE system (4.3.1), has the
following estimate
|Y i,j,(m)| ≤ Ky,
where the constant Ky is independent of m. Since f
i,j , ki1,i2 and lj1,j2 are
all bounded, then there exist the constants Kf ,Kk,Kl such that |f i,j | ≤ Kf ,
|ki1,i2 | ≤ Kk and |lj1,j2 | ≤ Kl. Let
Gi,js (y











{yi′,j + ki,i′s }
)+
− ryi,j .
Note that Gi,js (yi,j , y−i,−j) is Lipschitz continuous and nondecreasing in yi
′,j′
for (i′, j′) 6= (i, j). Moreover,
Gi,js (Y s, Y
−i,−j



















:= (Y , · · · , Y︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−1







(1)Kk − rY s
]
ds.
Then it follows from Lemma 4.3.1 that
Y
i,j,(m)
t ≤ Y t ≤ Ky







we can prove Y
i,j,(m)
t ≥ −Ky, and thus |Y
i,j,(m)
t | ≤ Ky.
Step 2. Existence: We first prove that (Y i,j,(m))m≥1 is a Cauchy sequence. For











































{yi,j′ − yi,j + Y i,j′,(n)s − lj,j
′
s } − Y i,j,(n)s )+











s })+ − (Y i,j,(n)s − U i,j,(n)s )+
]
− ryi,j
for y = (yi,j , y−i,−j) ∈ Rm with (i, j) ∈ Λ. Moreover, Gi,js (Y s, Y
−i,−j
s ) =





Kf1{s≥n} − rY s
]
ds.
It follows from Lemma 4.3.1 that
δY
i,j,(m,n)





















Sending m,n→∞, we can obtain that, for any T > 0, supt∈[0,T ] |δY
i,j,(m,n)
t | →





|Y i,jt | ≤ Ky.
We next prove that (Zi,j,(m))m≥1 is also a Cauchy sequence. By applying
Ito’s formula to e−2rt|δY i,j,(m,n)t |2 and using (4.3.2), we can obtain that∫ m
0
e−2rs|δZi,j,(m,n)s |2 ds

























(Y i,j,(m)s − U i,j,(m)s )+ − (Y i,j,(n)s − U i,j,(n)s )+
)
.
Taking expectation on both sides of (4.3.3) and using the boundedness result











where the constant Cz = 2
[
Kf + λ




from the dominated convergence theorem that δZi,j,(m,n) → 0 in H2,d−r , and
therefore there exists a limit process Zi,j such that Zi,j,(m) → Zi,j in H2,d−r .
It is standard to check the pair of limit processes (Y i,j , Zi,j)(i,j)∈Λ satisfy
the inifinite horizon BSDE system (4.2.6) (see, for example, Section 5 of [12]).





solutions to (4.2.6). For t ≥ 0, we define
δY i,jt := e
−rt(Y i,jt − Y
i,j






For T ≥ t, we have (δY i,jt , δZ
i,j
t )t∈[0,T ] is the solution to the following BSDE
system:




























− λ(2)(Li,js − Y
i,j
s )
































It is easy to see that Gi,js (yi,j , y−i,−j) is Lipschitz continuous and therefore
(δY i,j , δZi,j) is the unique solution to (4.3.4).
Let Y t = 2Kye
−rT . Since |δY i,jT | ≤ Y T and G
i,j
s (Y s, Y
−i,−j
s ) = 0, it follows
from Lemma 4.3.1 that |δY i,jt | ≤ Y T . By sending T → ∞, we can obtain
δY i,jt = 0, and therefore δZ
i,j
t = 0.
4.4 Proof of Theorem 4.2.5
4.4.1 Coupling of controls
In order to prove Theorem 4.2.5, we first give an equivalent formulation of
the constrained optimal switching games (4.2.4) and (4.2.5), by defining the
coupling of two controls α ∈ A and β ∈ B, where the latter is inspired by [32].
Definition 4.4.1 Given admissible switching controls α ∈ A and β ∈ B,
define the coupling γ(α, β) = (θn, cn)n≥0, where {θn}n≥0 is the merged arrival
sequence such that
θn = σrn ∧ τsn
with r0 = s0 = 0, r1 = s1 = 1 and for n ≥ 2,
rn = rn−1 + 1{σrn−1<τsn−1}, (4.4.1)
sn = sn−1 + 1{σrn−1≥τsn−1}, (4.4.2)
and cn is a Gλθn-measurable Λ-valued random variable such that c0 = (a0, b0)









n−1), if σrn < τsn , σrn < T,
(c
(1)
n−1, bsn), if τsn ≤ σrn , τsn < T,
cn−1, if σrn ∧ τsn ≥ T.
Let C denote the set of couplings γ(α, β) for both players, and Ci,j denote the
set of couplings γ(α, β) ∈ C satisfying θ0 = 0 and c0 = (i, j) ∈ Λ.
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The coupling switching decision at any time t ≥ 0 can be represented as




and thus, we can rewrite the payoff (4.2.3) as



























4.4.2 Constrained Dynkin game representation
The proof of Theorem 4.2.5 crucially depends on the constrained Dynkin game
representation for BSDE system (4.2.6). The new feature of this kind of Dynkin
game is that there are control constraints for both players, in the sense that
both players are only allowed to stop at two heterogeneous exogenous Poisson
arrival times T (1) and T (2).
For each player k ∈ {1, 2}, define a random variable Mk : Ω 7→ N :=





if T <∞ and Mk :=∞ if
T =∞. For every T (1) and T (2), we can construct a merged Poisson arrival






with r0 = s0 = 0, r1 = s1 = 1 and for n ≥ 2, rn and sn are given by








and define a random variable M : Ω 7→ N such that M :=
∑∞
n=1 n1{δn−1≤T<δn}
if T <∞ and M :=∞ if T =∞.
Remark 4.4.2 The merged Poisson arrival times δ = (δn)n≥0 constructed
above is exactly the increasing sequence of stopping times θ = (θk)k≥0 construc-
ted in Section 3.3. The idea is nothing but to merge the two Poisson sequences
together while still keeping track of their order, but here we use a different
definition in the spirit of Definition 4.4.1.
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For any integer n ≥ 0, let us define the control set for both players:
R(k)δn =
{
G-stopping time σ for σ(ω) = T
(k)
N (ω) where T
(k)
N (ω) ≥ δn
and N ≤Mk
}
for k ∈ {1, 2}. In the following constrained Dynkin game, two players choose
their respective stopping times σ ∈ R(1)δn and τ ∈ R
(2)
δn
in order to minim-
ize/maximize the cost functional








for (i, j) ∈ Λ and 1 ≤ n ≤M , where f i,j , hi,j , Li,j , U i,j are the data in BSDE
system (4.2.6).
For (i, j) ∈ Λ and 1 ≤ n ≤M , let us define the lower and upper values of





















= yi,jδn−1 a.s., and it is standard to show that if there exists a
saddle point (σi,jδn−1 , τ
i,j
δn−1







, τ) ≤ J̃ i,jδn−1(σ
i,j
δn−1
, τ i,jδn−1) ≤ J̃
i,j
δn−1
(σ, τ i,jδn−1) a.s. (4.4.6)
for every (σ, τ) ∈ R(1)δn ×R
(2)
δn





, τ i,jδn−1) a.s..
Remark 4.4.3 Although σi,jδn−1 and τ
i,j
δn−1




the subscripts δn−1 in the optimal stopping strategies represent the starting
time of the constrained Dynkin game.
Proposition 4.4.4 Suppose that Assumption 4.2.3 holds. Let (Y, Z) be the
unique solution to BSDE system (4.2.6). For (i, j) ∈ Λ and 1 ≤ n ≤ M ,
the value of the constrained Dynkin game (4.4.5) with starting time δn−1 and









and moreover, the optimal stopping strategy of the game is given by σ
i,j
δn−1









} ∧ T (1)M1 ,
τ i,jδn−1 = inf{T
(2)









} ∧ T (2)M2 ,
(4.4.7)
where Ỹ i,jt := e






−rtU i,jt for t ∈ [0, T ].
This proposition, when T is finite, essentially follows from Section 3.5.1.
For completeness and readers’ convenience, we provide the proof of Proposition
4.4.4 on an infinite horizon in the Appendix (see Section 4.A).
4.4.3 Main part of the proof
For the ease of notation, let us define the following discounted processes
f̃ i,jt = e







for t ∈ [0, T ], and h̃i,j = e−rThi,j , for (i, j) ∈ Λ. Then, the orginal payoff (4.4.4)
can be rewritten as



























and we are now in a position to prove Theorem 4.2.5.
Step 1. Let us construct a sequence (θn, cn)n≥0 such that θ0 = 0, c0 = (i, j) ∈ Λ











, defined by (4.4.7), are the optimal strategy of the























































∧ τ cn−1θn−1 ≥ T,
(4.4.10)
and define sequences α∗ = (σ∗n, a
∗
n)n≥0 and β
∗ = (τ∗n, b
∗
n)n≥0 such that σ
∗
0 =












N ) 6= a∗n−1} ∧ T
(1)
M1









N ) 6= b∗n−1} ∧ T
(2)
M2
, b∗n = c
(2)(τ∗n+),
(4.4.11)
where c(·) in (4.4.3) is defined by (4.4.9)-(4.4.10). By the construction of
75
α∗, a∗n is Gλσ∗n-measurable since G
λ is right-continuous, on {σ∗n ≥ T} we have
a∗n = a
∗
n−1, and hence α
∗ ∈ Ai. Similarly we can verify that β∗ ∈ Bj , and
hence γ(α∗, β∗) ∈ Ci,j .
We now prove the following equality




Indeed, it follows from Proposition 4.4.4 that
yi,j0 = E
[ ∫ σi,j0 ∧τ i,j0 ∧T
0



















where σi,j0 and τ
i,j





T, σi,j0 < τ
i,j


























Similarly, by the definition of b∗1, on {τ
i,j











































On the other hand, we also have, conditional on {θ1 < T},




[ ∫ σc1θ1∧τc1θ1 ∧T
θ1




















































































































































Step 2. For any given β = (τn, bn)n≥0 ∈ Bj , define α∗(β) = (σ∗n, a∗n)n≥0 such
that σ∗0 = 0, a
∗











, a∗n = c
(1)(σ∗n+), with c(·) is defined using the sequence (θn, cn)n≥0








, defined by (4.4.7), is the optimal strategy for Player I of the































, if τsn ≤ σ
cn−1
θn−1




∧ τsn ≥ T,
(4.4.16)
with the sequence {sn}n≥0 defined iteratively by s0 = 0, s1 = 1 and for n ≥ 2,




By the construction, it is obvious α∗ ∈ Ai.
We now prove the following equality






Indeed, it follows from Proposition 4.4.4 and (4.4.6) that
yi,j0 ≥ E
[ ∫ σi,j0 ∧τ1∧T
0











By the definition of a∗1 and L̃
i,j






















































































for any β ∈ Bj . This implies (4.4.17), since
yi,j0 ≥ sup
β∈Bj
J(γ(α∗(β), β)) ≥ J(γ(α∗(β∗), β∗)) = J(γ(α∗, β∗)) = yi,j0
where β∗ is given in Step 1 (i.e. (4.4.11)) and the last equality follows from
(4.4.12).
Similarly, for any given α = (σn, an)n≥0 ∈ Ai, define β∗(α) = (τ∗n, b∗n)n≥0
such that τ∗0 = 0, b
∗











, b∗n = c
(2)(τ∗n+), with c(·) is defined using the sequence (θn, cn)n≥0







defined by (4.4.7), is the optimal strategy for Player II of the constrained








, if σrn < τ
cn−1
θn−1
, σrn < T,(
c
(1)

























with the sequence {rn}n≥0 defined iteratively by r0 = 0, r1 = 1 and for n ≥ 2,




By the construction, β∗ ∈ Bj , and using the similar arguments, we can have































J(γ(α, β)) = vi,j
which completes the proof of Theorem 4.2.5.
4.5 Connection with constrained single-player op-
timal switching problems
In this section, we will show, under some additional conditions on the running
reward f i,j and terminal reward hi,j , the values of both the static game (4.2.4)
and the dynamic game (4.2.5) exist. The relationship of (4.2.4)-(4.2.5) and the
value of a constrained single-player optimal switching problem is also studied.
Constrained single-player optimal switching problems were first introduced
in [59]. The setup is the same as in Section 4.2 except that there is only a single
player in the problem, Player I (resp. II) chooses his (resp. her) admissible
switching controls α = (σn, an)n≥0 ∈ Ai (resp. β = (τn, bn)n≥0 ∈ Bj) in order
to maximise the following payoff functional



























where a(·) (resp. b(·)) is given by (4.2.1) (resp. (4.2.2)). For i ∈ Λ1 (resp.
j ∈ Λ2), f (1),i and h(1),i (resp. f (2),j and h(2),j) define a running reward and a
terminal reward received by the player, whose active mode is i (resp. j). For
i1, i2 ∈ Λ1 (resp. j1, j2 ∈ Λ2), ki1,i2 (resp. lj1,j2) defines a payment from the
player, who switches the active mode from mode i1 (resp. j1) to i2 (resp. j2).
Let us define the value of the constrained single-player optimal switching










and α∗ ∈ Ai (resp. β∗ ∈ Bj) attaining the supremum in (4.5.3) is called his
(resp. her) optimal switching strategy.
We impose the following additional condition on the running and terminal
rewards.
Assumption 4.5.1 For (i, j) ∈ Λ, the f i,j and hi,j are separated with respect
to i and j, i.e.
f i,j := f (2),j − f (1),i and hi,j := h(2),j − h(1),i, (4.5.4)
and moreover, (i) when T =∞, f (1),i and f (2),j are bounded; (ii) when T <∞,
f (1),i, f (2),j ∈ H2,1 and h(1),i, h(2),j ∈ L2,1.
Proposition 4.5.2 Suppose that Assumption 4.2.3 and 4.5.1 hold. Then,
there exists a unique solution (Y (1), Z(1)) to the following BSDE system defined














{Y (1),i′s − ki,i
′








for t ∈ [0, T ] and i ∈ Λ1, and a unique solution (Y (2), Z(2)) to the following














{Y (2),j′s − lj,j
′








for t ∈ [0, T ] and j ∈ Λ2. For every initial state (i, j) ∈ Λ, the values of both
the static game (4.2.4) and the dynamic game (4.2.5) exist, i.e.
vi,j = vi,j = V
i,j




and the optimal pair of controls (α∗, β∗) ∈ Ai ×Bj of the constained optimal
switching games (4.2.4) is the sequences α∗ = (σ∗n, a
∗
n)n≥0 such that σ
∗
0 =








































and β∗ = (τ∗n, b
∗
n)n≥0 such that τ
∗
0 = 0, b
∗








































Proof. Since f i,j and hi,j are separated with respect to i and j, for any
pair of controls (α, β) ∈ Ai ×Bj , we have
J(α, β) = J (2)(β)− J (1)(α)
where J (1)(α) and J (2)(β) are given by (4.5.1) and (4.5.2). Thus, we have




J (1)(α) = v(2),j − v(1),i,
where the last equality follows from BSDE characterization (4.5.5)-(4.5.6) of





(1),i = J (1)(α∗)




(2),j = J (2)(β∗)
with the optimal switching strategy β∗ given by (4.5.9). It remains to prove
that (α∗, β∗) is the optimal pair of controls of the constained optimal switching
games (4.2.4). Indeed, for any pair of controls (α, β) ∈ Ai ×Bj , we have
J(α∗, β) = J (2)(β)− J (1)(α∗) ≤ J (2)(β∗)− J (1)(α∗)
= J(α∗, β∗)
≤ J (2)(β∗)− J (1)(α) = J(α, β∗).
81
4.6 Application to the duopolistic competition in
resource extraction
In this section, we study the duopolistic competition in resource extraction for
which both producers are only allowed to make their decisions at Poisson arrival
times. The problem is adapted from the classical model imposed by Brekke
and Øksendal [10], where they considered the case of a single producer without
any switching constraints. Traditionally, duopolistic competition models often
assume that both producers are allowed to make decisions at any stopping time.
In reality, there may exist some liquidation constraint as an external shock,
and both players only make their decisions when such a shock arrives. We
model such a liquidation shock as the arrival times of two exogenous Poisson
processes.
4.6.1 Problem formulation
There are two large producers in the market. We assume that the price Pt at
time t per unit of the resource follows a geometric Brownian motion starting
from P0 = p ∈ R+ with constant drift b and constant volatility σ > 0:
dPt = bPt dt+ σPt dWt.
For producer k ∈ {1, 2}, let Q(k)t denote the stock of remaining resources in
the field . We assume when the field is open, extraction rate is proportional to








where η(k) > 0 is a constant, Q
(k)
0 = q
(k) and X(k) is a Gλ-adapted, finite





1 if the field is open at time t
0 if the field is closed at time t.
At time 0, we assume X
(k)
0 = x
(k) ∈ {0, 1}. The extraction can operate in
two modes, open and closed. The transition from one operating mode to the
other is immediate and the management is only allowed to make decisions at
a sequence of Possion random intervention times T (k) = {T (k)n }n≥0 with the
constant intensity λ(k) > 0. Let Ai (resp. Bj) denote the family of X(1) (resp.
X(2)) satisfying x(1) = i (resp. x(2) = j).
We assume that, when the field is open, there is a constant profit rate
constraint M (k) > 0 per time unit, which is imposed by the government to
avoid the producers obtaining supernormal profits. We also assume there is
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a constant standby cost C(k) > 0 per time unit resulting from a closed field.
Then the net profit rate for each producer k is given by
f (k)(t, p, q, x) = e−rt
(
min{η(k)pq,M (k)}x− C(k)(1− x)
)
where r > max{0, b} is the discount rate.




1 > 0 represent the positive
costs resulting from switching the extraction mode from the open to the closed
mode and vice versa.
We model the duopolistic competition between two large producers, whose
performance can be measured by the difference of their expected profits, i.e.
J(p, q(1), q(2), X(1), X(2)) = J (2)(p, q(2), X(2))− J (1)(p, q(1), X(1)) (4.6.1)
where the individual performance criterion J (k)(p, q(k), X(k)) is given by































t , for each player k ∈ {1, 2}.
For the initial state (i, j) ∈ {0, 1}2, producer II will choose X(2) ∈ Bj to
maximize the profit difference (4.6.1), while producer I will choose X(1) ∈ Ai
to minimize the difference. Either in positive or negative direction, the large
difference means one large producer dominates the market and wins the game.
This leads to an aforementioned constrained optimal switching game with
separated running and terminal rewards.
Let us define the upper and lower value of this constrained duopolistic
competition as follows




J(p, q(1), q(2), X(1), X(2)), (4.6.2)




J(p, q(1), q(2), X(1), X(2)). (4.6.3)
Applying Proposition 4.5.2, we obtain this constrained duopolistic compet-
ition has value





where Y (1),i (resp. Y (2),j) is the first component of the solution to the following
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i− C(1)(1− i)− rY (1),is
+ λ(1)
(
Y (1),1−is − iK
(1)
























j − C(2)(1− j)− rY (2),js
+ λ(2)
(
Y (2),1−js − jK
(2)




























Moreover, the optimal switching strategy (α∗, β∗) ∈ Ai×Bj of this constrained
duopolistic competition (4.6.2)-(4.6.3) is given by the sequence α∗ = (σ∗n, a
∗
n)n≥0
such that σ∗0 = 0, a
∗























a∗n = 1− a∗n−1
;
(4.6.5)
and β∗ = (τ∗n, b
∗
n)n≥0 such that τ
∗
0 = 0, b
∗























b∗n = 1− b∗n−1
.
(4.6.6)
4.6.2 The structure of switching regions
In the rest of this section, we investigate the structure of switching regions of
both players. By the results (4.6.4)-(4.6.6), we can observe both players will
make similar optimal switching decisions and their decisions are independent
from each other. We only study Player I’s switching regions since the other
player’s counterparts follow immediately.
To ease the notation, we omit the superscripts (1) from now on. By
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observing Pt and Qt only enter the performance criterion as PtQt, we define
Γt = PtQt
which satisfies the SDE
dΓt = (b− ηXt)Γt dt+ σΓt dWt, Γ0 = pq := z.
As a direct consequence of the previous subsection, for i ∈ {0, 1}, we have
vi(z) = sup
X∈Ai
J̃(z,X) = Y i0































for t ≥ 0, with Γi following
dΓit = (b− ηi)Γit dt+ σΓit dWt, Γi0 = z.
By the Markov property of Γi, we can have Y it = v
i(Γit), where v = (v
0, v1)
solve the ODE system
−L0v0 + rv0 = λ
(
v1 −K1 − v0
)+ − C, (4.6.9)
−L1v1 + rv1 = λ
(
v0 −K0 − v1
)+
+ min{ηz,M}, (4.6.10)
with the operator Li = 12σ
2z2∂2zz + (b− ηi)z∂z (the connection between BSDE
and ODE is quite standard in the BSDE literature, and thus we refer to Section
4 of [12] and Section 5 of [40] for rigorous proofs).
For later use, we define the stopping region (Si) and the continuation region
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(Ci) as
Si = {z ∈ R+ : vi(z) ≤ v1−i(z)− iK0 − (1− i)K1},
Ci = {z ∈ R+ : vi(z) > v1−i(z)− iK0 − (1− i)K1},
for i ∈ {0, 1}. Furthermore, we define
zi = inf Si ∈ [0,∞] and zi = supSi ∈ [0,∞]
with the usual convention inf ∅ =∞ and sup ∅ = 0.
The main result of this section is the following characterization of the
switching regions of the above constrained duopolistic competition problem
(4.6.2)-(4.6.3).
Theorem 4.6.1 Suppose the assumptions in this section hold, and that the
value function v = (v0, v1) is twice continuously differentiable in z. Then, we
have the following structures of the switching regions S0 and S1:
S0 =

(0,∞), if − rK1 ≥ −C
[z0,∞) for some z0 ∈ (0,∞), if − rK1 < −C ≤M − rK1
∅, if M − rK1 < −C
,
and S1 = ∅.
The economic intuition behind Theorem 4.6.1 is as follows. Firstly, note
that the open mode (mode 1) is more favorable than the closed mode (mode
0). Since the switching cost from open mode to closed K0 is always positive,
then one has no interest to switch to closed mode from open. On the other
hand, if the switching cost from closed to open K1 is less than the standby cost
resulting from a closed field, i.e. −rK1 ≥ −C, the producer would switch to the
open mode (higher regime) as soon as possible; if the switching cost can never
be compensated by the net running profit, i.e. M − rK1 < −C, the producer
would never switch to the open mode; if the net running profit may exceed
the loss due to the switching cost in some state, i.e. −rK1 < −C ≤M − rK1,
then one may switch to open mode when the net running profit rate reaches
some level at Poisson arrival times. The various structures of the switching
regions are demonstrated in Figure 4.1.
4.6.3 Proof of Theorem 4.6.1
Step 1. We first prove that S1 = ∅. By picking X1 ≡ 1 ∈ A1, we have




























(c) M − rK1 < −C
Figure 4.1: The various structures of the switching regions.
where J̃ is given by (4.6.7), for any X ∈ A0. This implies
v1(z) ≥ v0(z) > v0(z)−K0
for ∀z ∈ (0,∞), i.e. S1 = ∅.
Step 2. In this step, we show the following priori results on v1:
0 ≤ ∂zv1 ≤
η
r − b+ η
, (4.6.11)
∂2zzv
1 ≤ 0, (4.6.12)























where A+, B− are given by (4.6.16) and α± are given by (4.6.15).




e−rt min{ηΓ1,zt ,M} dt
]
where Γ1,zt = z exp((b− η − 12σ
2)t+ σWt) with the initial value Γ
1,z
0 = z.
For any z ≥ z̄ > 0, we have Γ1,zt ≥ Γ
1,z̄
t for all t ≥ 0, and therefore
v1(z) ≥ v1(z̄), which proves the first inequality of (4.6.11).
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For any z, z̄ ∈ R+, we have
∣∣v1(z)− v1(z̄)∣∣ ≤ E[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rt









e−(r−b+η)tη|z − z̄| dt
=
η
r − b+ η
|z − z̄|,
which proves the second inequality of (4.6.11).
For any z, z̄ ∈ R+ and κ ∈ [0, 1], we have






















e−rt min{ηΓ1,κz+(1−κ)z̄t ,M} dt
]
= v1(κz + (1− κ)z̄),
which proves (4.6.12).
As another direct consequence of step 1, (4.6.10) is reduced to the following
equation
− L1v1 + rv1 = min{ηz,M}. (4.6.14)


























































satisfying α+ > 1 and α− < 0. The boundary conditions imply that
A− = B+ = 0.
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Indeed, as z → 0, we have Γ1,zt → 0 for any t ≥ 0, then v1(0+) = 0, and as
z →∞, we have Γ1,zt →∞ for any t ≥ 0, then v1(∞) = Mr .




(z) across the point z = Mη ,
we can determine the two unknowns A+ and B−, i.e.
A+ =













Step 3. We next prove S0 = (0,∞) if −rK1 ≥ −C.
Define G0(z) = v
0(z)− v1(z) +K1, then the switching region
S0 = {z ∈ R+ : G0(z) ≤ 0}.
We can then obtain G0 is the solution to the following ODE:
− L0G0 − ηz∂zv1 + rG0 = λ(−G0)+ −min{ηz,M} − C + rK1. (4.6.17)
Because the terms on the right-hand-side of (4.6.17) are not continuously dif-
ferentiable, in order to prove G′0(z) ≤ 0, we construct a penalty approximation
of (4.6.17). Suppose G0,ε satisfies
−L0G0,ε−ηz∂zv1 +rG0,ε = λ(−G0,ε)+−πε(ηz−M)−M−C+rK1 (4.6.18)




ε (z) ≤ 0,
limε→0+ πε(z) = min(z, 0), and
πε(z) =

z, z ≤ −ε,
↗, |z| ≤ ε,
0, z ≥ ε.









1 − π′ε(ηz −M) + z∂2zzv1
)
where H(x) = 1[0,∞)(x). Using the priori results (4.6.11)-(4.6.13) on v
1
obtained in Step 1, we can prove that the right-hand-side of the above equation




























since B− ≤ 0. Thus, it follows from the comparision results (see, for example,
Section 4.4 in [70]) that G′0,ε(z) ≤ 0. By letting ε→ 0, we have a continuous
limit (of a subsequence if necessary) G′0(z), that is, G
′
0,ε(z)→ G′0(z) uniformly
in C(R+), and then we obtain the required result (see, for example, Proof of
Lemma 5 in [14]).






















we can compute that, in the case of −rK1 ≥ −C,
G0(0+) = v




This proves that S0 = (0,∞) if −rK1 ≥ −C.
Step 4. We now prove S0 = [z0,∞) for some z0 ∈ (0,∞) if −rK1 < −C ≤
M − rK1 and S0 = ∅ if M − rK1 < −C.
Note that G′0(z) ≤ 0, and for both cases, we have −rK1 < −C, and then
G0(0+) = v




In the case of −rK1 < −C ≤ M − rK1, we only need to prove that z0 6= ∞.
If not, then G0(z) > 0 for ∀z ∈ (0,∞), and then (4.6.17) is reduced to
−L0G0 + rG0 = F0(z)
where F0(z) := ηz∂zv











Using Fatou’s lemma and the explicity form (4.6.13) of v1, we have















−M − C + rK1
r
≤ 0,
which provides the desired contradiction.
In the case of M − rK1 < −C, we need to show that z0 =∞. If not, then
0 < z0 < ∞. Due to the continuity of G0(z), we have G0(z0) = 0. Then it
follows that G0(z) ≤ 0 for z ∈ (z0,∞), and therefore, (4.6.17) is reduced to
−L0G0 + (r + λ)G0 = F0(z)
on (z0,∞). If we can show F0(z) > 0, then it follows from the comparison
results that G0(z) > 0 on (z
0,∞), which provides the desired contradiction.
Indeed, it is straightforward to prove F0(z) > 0 since we have F
′
0 ≤ 0 by
(4.6.19)-(4.6.20), and F0(∞) = −M − C + rK1 > 0.
4.A Proof of Proposition 4.4.4 on an infinite hori-
zon
The proof is adapted from the proof of Section 3.5.1, where a finite horizon
problem was considered.















and the lower and upper values of the revised auxiliary constrained Dynkin









R̃i,j (σ, τ) |Gδn−1
]
, (4.A.1)






R̃i,j (σ, τ) |Gδn−1
]
, (4.A.2)
where the revised payoff function is given by
R̃i,j(σ, τ) = L
i,j




Thus, to prove Proposition 4.4.4 on an infinite horizon, it is equivalent to prove
that qi,jδn−1 = q
i,j
δn−1
= qi,jδn−1 = Y
i,j
δn−1 , and the optimal stopping strategy of the
game is given by σ
i,j
δn−1










τ i,jδn−1 = inf{T
(2)



















−ruf i,ju du, for t ≥ 0.
We are now in a position to prove Proposition 4.4.4.
Step 1. We first show that Y
i,j





min{U i,jδn , Y
i,j
δn}1{δn<∞,δn∈T (1)}





for n ≥ 1. On the one hand, applying Itô’s formula to αtY
i,j










λ(1) min{U s, Y
i,j










and thus, by choosing t = δn−1 and taking the conditional expectation with







(1)+λ(2))(s−δn−1)[λ(1) min{U s, Y
i,j
s }




for any n ≥ 1. On the other hand, by applying the probability density function
of δn conditional on Gδn−1 , we can also obtain the right-hand-side of (4.A.4)
equals the right-hand-side of the above equation (see the proof of Lemma 3.3.3).
This proves that Y
i,j
δn−1 satisfies the recursive equation (4.A.4) for n ≥ 1.
Step 2. As a direct consequence, we deduce that Ŷ i,jδn−1 defined by









satisfies the following recursive equation:









|Gδn−1 ]}1{δn−1<∞,δn−1∈T (2)} (4.A.5)
for any n ≥ 1. In this step, we will show that Ŷ i,jδn−1 is actually the value of an
auxiliary constrained Dynkin game starting from δn−1, whose lower and upper




















R̃i,j (σ, τ) |Gδn−1
]
, (4.A.7)
with the optimal stopping strategy of the auxiliary game is given by σ̂
i,j
δn−1











τ̂ i,jδn−1 = inf{T
(2)












Using the similar arguments as in the proof of Lemma 3.3.4, it is easy to























is a G̃-submartingale, for any σ ∈ R(1)δn−1 .
It follows from the martingale property (i) that






























and using (4.A.8), we can obtain





























Likewise, it follows from the supermartingale property (ii) and the submartin-

















for any (σ, τ) ∈ R(1)δn−1 ×R
(2)
δn−1
. It then follows that the value of the auxiliary
game (4.A.6)-(4.A.7) exists, i.e.









and (σ̂i,jδn−1 , τ̂
i,j
δn−1
) in (4.A.8) is indeed an optimal stopping strategy of the
auxiliary game (4.A.6)-(4.A.7). The uniqueness of the solution to the recursive
equation (4.A.5) is an immediate consequence.
Step 3. Let Y
i,j

















































for any (σ, τ) ∈ R(1)δn × R
(2)
δn











and (σ̂i,jδn , τ̂
i,j
δn
) is indeed an optimal stopping strategy of the game (4.A.1)-
(4.A.2). It is immediate to verify (σ̂i,jδn , τ̂
i,j
δn






Pricing Rollover Debt in an
Incomplete Market
5.1 Introduction
Short-term debt has often been blamed for triggering the financial crisis of
2007-2008. However, several reasons support the use of short-term borrowing
in addition to its cost advantage. Diamond and Rajan [20] argue that the
direction of causality is the opposite to the one traditionally suggested, and
that a ban on short-term financing may cause a more serious crisis. Moreover,
He and Xiong [34] argue that, as a disciplinary device for firms, short-term
financing can be used to alleviate adverse selection problems and to reduce the
cost of auditing firms. In reality, those firms, which finance their long-term
fundamental assets by short-term debt contracts, typically spread out their
debt expirations over time to reduce liquidity risk. This realistic staggered
debt structure motivates the study of rollover debt.
Rollover debt was first introduced by Leland [53] and Leland and Toft [54],
with Hilberink and Rogers [38] providing further technical details. The idea is
to assume a random duration of debt to reflect the maturity mismatch between
the assets and the liabilities sides. Recently, a similar idea has appeared in the
modeling of debt run problems to capture this kind of liquidity constraints
(see, for example, [34] and [58]), where debt maturities are modelled as arrival
times of a Poisson process. Once a creditor lends money to the firm, the debt
contract lasts until the arrival of an independent Poisson shock. The creditor
can decide, at each rollover date, whether to roll over or to withdraw her
funding.
In this chapter, we study this kind of rollover debt in incomplete market
environments. Incompleteness comes from the fact that the fundamental assets
might not be freely traded or their payoffs might not be perfectly spanned by
other assets. The creditor can at best trade in risky assets correlated with the
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fundamental assets. This provides a hedging opportunity for the creditor, but
she still faces the idiosyncratic risk, which is unhedgeable. We use a utility
maximization framework in which the creditor chooses her withdrawal time
and a hedge position to maximize her expected utility of wealth, which comes
from her bond payoff and hedge portfolio. We investigate the creditor’s rollover
decisions and price rollover debt in an incomplete market.
Turning to the literature, the impact of incomplete markets on investment
timing was first considered by Miao and Wang [64] in a model with consumption
and portfolio. Henderson [35] examines the impact of market incompleteness
and values the option to invest using a model closer to the canonical complete
real option model of McDonald and Siegel [60] and Dixit and Pindyck [21].
Although different kinds of real options are considered, our set-up still relates
to Henderson’s.
The key contribution of this chapter is to provide a rigorous formulation for
a class of rollover-decision and rollover-debt-pricing models in an incomplete
market, by introducing a new class of mixed stochastic control and constrained
optimal stopping problems (see (5.2.3)). Standard mixed stochastic control
and optimal stopping problems were first studied by Karatzas and Kou [46] to
price American contingent claims under constraints. More examples include
Karatzas and Sudderth [47], Karatzas and Wang [48], and Henderson and
Hobson [37].
Compared to standard mixed stochastic control and optimal stopping
problems, the new class of problems has a stopping constraint in the sense that
the player is only allowed to stop at a sequence of exogenous Poisson arrival
times (in the current set-up, the creditor is only allowed to withdraw her funding
at a sequence of rollover dates generated by an exogenous Poisson process). The
optimal stopping problem with stopping constraints was introduced by Dupuis
and Wang [25] to model perpetual American options exercised at exogenous
Poisson arrival times. See also Lempa [55], Liang [57], Liang and Wei [59],
and Menaldi and Robin [61]-[62] for further extensions of this type of optimal
stopping problems. Recently, Liang and Sun (Chapter 2) introduce the Dynkin
games with constaints on both players’ stopping times and apply it to model
perpetual convertible bonds with liquidation constraints.
Our first main result is Theorem 5.3.1, the verification theorem, charac-
terizing, under some assumptions, the value function of the problem and its
associated optimal control / stopping strategy in terms of the solution of a
penalized PDE, where the latter is widely used to approximate the solution of
a variational inequality (VI).
The second main result is Theorem 5.4.4, which gives the complete charac-
terization in the case of exponential utility. Theorem 5.4.4 also characterizes
exponential indifference bond price and its associated optimal control / stop-
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ping strategy, both of which are proved to be wealth independent. Thanks
to the above results, we further investigate the impact of parameters on the
bond price. Furthermore, following from the convergence of penalized PDEs to
VIs, we make a connection with mixed stochastic control and optimal stopping
problems without stopping constraints (see (5.5.1)). That is, the value func-
tion of the problem with stopping constraints will converge to that without
stopping constraints when the Poisson intensity goes to infinity. Inspired by
the theoretical analysis of exponential indifference bond price in a complete
market, we conduct some numerical experiments to examine the shapes of the
stopping and continuation regions of the problem in an incomplete market,
and observe that both regions are swapped over for different parameter values.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 contains the problem
formulation. Section 5.3 presents the verification theorem. In Section 5.4, in the
case of exponential utility, we verify the assumptions imposed to the verification
theorem for the complete characterization and obtain some properties of
exponential indifference bond price. In Section 5.5, we establish a connection
with standard mixed stochastic control and optimal stopping problems and
solve in closed form both the price and optimal stopping strategy of a rollover
debt without stopping constraints in a complete market. Section 5.6 concludes
the chapter by some numerical results for optimal stopping strategies.
5.2 The model
Let W = (W 1,W 2) be a 2-dimensional Brownian motion on a filtered prob-
ability space (Ω,F ,F = {Ft}t≥0,P) satisfying the usual conditions, where Ft
is the augmented σ-algebra generated by W. Let (Ti)i≥0 be the arrival times
of an independent Poisson process with intensity λ and minimal augmented
filtration {Ht}t≥0. Denote the smallest filtration generated by F and H as
G = {Gt}t≥0, i.e. Gt = Ft ∨ Ht. Without loss of generality, we assume that
T0 = 0 and T∞ = ∞. For a finite horizon T < ∞ representing the terminal
time of the problem, there exists an interger-valued random variable M <∞
such that TM−1 ≤ T < TM , i.e. M(ω) =
∑
n≥1 n1{Tn(ω)≤T<Tn(ω)}.
Consider a finitely-lived, risk averse creditor, who purchased a rollover bond
issued by a firm with fundamental asset value V , at initiation time 0 until
maturity T1. The face value of the debt is K
1. At T1, the bond matures, and
the creditor can decide to whether withdraw her funding receiving KerT1 , the
sum of the face value and accrued interest payments, or successively roll over
until the next rollover date, where the constant r is the spread rate (either
positive or negative), representing the yield difference between this bond and
1We express all amounts in discounted units or equivalently take the risk-free bond as
numeraire.
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risk-free bond, and the maturity dates (or rollover dates) are modelled by the
aforementioned independent Poisson arrival times (Ti)i≥1.
For any i ≥ 0, let us define the creditor’s withdrawal control set RλTi as
RλTi = {G-stopping time τ for τ(ω) = TN (ω) where i ≤ N ≤M},
and the payoff of this bond would be delivered at either the withdrawal time
τ ∈ RλT1 if τ happens before the terminal time T , or T otherwise.
Moreover, the cash flow at the time of delivery t is assumed to be in the
following form
φ(t, Vt) := min{Vt,Kt}
where Kt = Ke
rt. This means, at the time of delivery t, the creditor will collect
Kt if the firm is solvent. However, if the firm fails to repay the creditor, i.e.
Vt < Kt, it has to prematurely liquidate the fundamental asset at a fire-sale
price, which, for simplicity, we assume equals its fundamental value.
The market consists of risk-free bonds and a traded risky asset S, where
the latter is correlated with V . We assume the risky asset value S and the
fundamental asset value V follow from geometric Brownian motion processes:
dSt
St










1− ρ2 dW 2t ), (5.2.1)
where Sharpe ratios ξ, η and volatilities σS , σV are constants.
This bond is exposure to the traded or market risk, represented by Brownian
motion W 1, and the non-traded idiosyncratic risk, represented by W 2. When
correlation is one, the model is complete. However, one faces idiosyncratic risk
and incomplete markets if |ρ| < 1. The creditor invests in the risky asset S so
that she can, to some extent, hedge the market risk, represented by W 1.
Let π denote the holdings in the risky asset S, resulting in Xπ, the total







ξ dt+ dW 1t
)
. (5.2.2)
A R-valued F-predictable process π = (πt)0≤t≤T is called a self-financing
trading strategy if π satisfies the integrability condition E[
∫ T
0 |πt|
2 dt] < ∞.
This integrability condition ensures the existence and uniqueness of a strong
solution to stochastic differential equation (SDE) (5.2.2).
The creditor chooses her withdrawal time τ and admissible self-financing
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trading strategy π, in order to maximize her expected performance from both
investing in the market and receiving the bond payoff. This leads to the
following mixed stochastic control and constrained optimal stopping problem:
Y λ(x, v) = ess sup
τ∈RλT1 ,π∈U0,τ∧T
E [U (τ ∧ T,Xπτ∧T + φ(τ ∧ T , Vτ∧T ))|Xπ0 = x, V0 = v] ,
(5.2.3)
where U is the admissible control set which will be defined in Definition 5.2.1,
and U(t, x) is a time-dependent deterministic utility function satisfying
• for each t ≥ 0, the mapping x 7→ U(t, x) is increasing and strictly concave
in x ∈ R and
• for 0 ≤ t ≤ s <∞, we have
U(t,Xπt ) = ess sup
π∈Ut,s
E [U (Xπs )| Ft] .
Note that, in related literature, this time-dependent utility function U can
be regarded as a deterministic case of forward performance processes in [66]
and the second condition is also referred to as the horizon-unbiased condition
in [36].
A pair (τ∗, π∗) ∈ RλT1 × U0,τ∗∧T is called an optimal control / stopping
strategy for the problem (5.2.3) if




τ∗ ∧ T,Xπ∗τ∗∧T + φ(τ∗ ∧ T , Vτ∗∧T )
)∣∣∣Xπ∗0 = x, V0 = v] .
In order to solve the main problem (5.2.3), we choose an admissible set from
which we can select the optimal trading strategy. Note that the integrability
condition in the following definition guarantees that there is no arbitrage, while
the class (D) condition is technical.
Definition 5.2.1 The set of admissible trading strategies U consists of all R-




∞, and the class (D) condition:
{U(ν,Xπν ) : ν is a stopping time taking values in [0, T ]}
is a uniformly integrable family. We denote by Ua,b, the set of admissible
strategies over the period [a, b], for 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ T .
We are now ready to provide the definition of the creditor’s indifference
bond price with stopping constraints. The creditor’s indifference bond price
is defined as the cash amount such that the creditor is indifferent between
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two positions: (i) optimal investment with the bond, (ii) optimal investment
without the bond but instead with extra initial wealth.
Definition 5.2.2 The creditor’s indifference bond price with stopping con-
straints P λ(x, v) is defined by the equation
Y λ(x, v) = U(0, x+ P λ(x, v)), (5.2.4)
where Y λ is given by (5.2.3), provided it exists.
5.3 Verification theorem for Y λ
Theorem 5.3.1 Let y be a function in C1,2,2([0, T )×R×R+) ∩ C([0, T ]×
R×R+), satisfying
− ∂ty(t, x, v)− sup
π∈R
Lπ1y(t, x, v)− λ (U(t, x+ φ(t, v))− y(t, x, v))
+ = 0,














• {y(ν,Xπν , Vν) : ν is a stopping time taking values in [0, T ]} is uniformly
integrable for any π ∈ U0,T ,
• for all (t, x, v) ∈ [0, T ) × R × R+, there exists a measurable function
π∗ : [0, T )×R×R+ → U such that
π∗(t, x, v) ∈ arg max
π∈R





ξ dt+ dW 1t
)
, X∗0 = x (5.3.3)
admits a unique solution,
• and the process (π∗(t,X∗t , Vt))0≤t≤T ∈ U0,T ,
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then Y λ(x, v) = y(0, x, v) for (x, v) ∈ R × R+, and (τ∗, π∗) is an optimal
control / stopping strategy, where
τ∗ = inf
{
Ti ≥ T1 : y(Ti ∧ T,X∗Ti∧T , VTi∧T )
≤ U(Ti ∧ T,X∗Ti∧T + φ(Ti ∧ T , VTi∧T ))
}
. (5.3.4)
Proof. In this proof, we denote by {Xt,x,πs , t ≤ s ≤ T} the solution of
(5.2.2) with control process π and initial condition Xt,x,πt = x, and denote by
{V t,vs , t ≤ s ≤ T} the solution of (5.2.1) with initial condition V t,vt = v.
Step 1. Let π ∈ U0,T be an arbitrary control process, and define the stopping
time
θn = (T − n−1) ∧ inf
{
s > 0 : |X0,x,πs − x|+ |V 0,vs − v| ≥ n
}
.





, V 0,vθn )−
∫ θn
0



























where W̃ 2 := ρW 1 +
√
1− ρ2W 2 is a Brownian motion. Since both stochastic
integrals are martingales on [0, θn], a consequence of the continuity of ∂xy and







, V 0,vθn )−
∫ θn
0



















where we define ŷ(t, x, v) := max{y(t, x, v), U(t, x+ φ(t, v))}. By the uniform
integrabilities of y(·, X0,x,π· , V 0,v· ) and U(·, X0,x,π· + φ(·, V 0,v· )), and then by

















U(T,X0,x,πT + φ(T, V
0,v
T ))1{T1≥T} + ŷ(T1, X
0,x,π
T1









where the second equality holds by applying the probability density function
of T1. If we can claim the following inequality








holds for any (τ, π) ∈ RλT1 × UT1∧T,τ∧T . By plugging (5.3.7) into (5.3.6), we
can obtain













y(0, x, v) ≥ Y λ(x, v).
It remains to prove (5.3.7) holds. Indeed, using the similar arguments to
prove (5.3.6), we have
y(T1 ∧ T, x, v) ≥ E
[




for any π ∈ UT1∧T,T2∧T . The definition of ŷ and (5.3.8) give that
ŷ(T1 ∧ T, x, v) ≥ E
[
ŷ(T2 ∧ T,XT1∧T,x,πT2∧T , V
T1∧T,v
T2∧T )
∣∣∣GT1∧T ] . (5.3.9)
Likewise, we can have
ŷ(T2 ∧ T, x, v) ≥ E
[




for any π ∈ UT2∧T,T3∧T . By plugging (5.3.10) into (5.3.9), we have
ŷ(T1 ∧ T, x, v) ≥ E
[




for any π ∈ UT1∧T,T3∧T . From (5.3.9) and (5.3.11), it is easy to see the following
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inequality holds:
ŷ(T1 ∧ T, x, v) ≥ E
[










for any (τ, π) ∈ RλT2 × UT1∧T,τ∧T , and hence, together with the definition of ŷ,
(5.3.7) follows.
Step 2. In order to prove the reverse inequality, let us introduce the following
auxiliary problem associated with (5.2.3):












and (τ̂∗, π̂∗) ∈ RλT1×UT1∧T,τ̂∗∧T is called an optimal control / stopping strategy
if







∗ ∧ T , V T1∧T,vτ̂∗∧T )
)∣∣∣GT1∧T ] .
Note that the difference between (5.3.12) and (5.2.3) is that the former is
allowed to stop its corresponding initial starting time, while the latter not.
In this step, we aim to show that
ŷ(T1 ∧ T, x, v) = Ŷ λ(T1 ∧ T, x, v), (5.3.13)
and the optimal control / stopping strategy (τ̂∗, π̂∗) is
τ̂∗ = inf
{
Ti ≥ T1 : ŷ(Ti ∧ T,XT1∧T,x,∗Ti∧T , V
T1∧T,v
Ti∧T )






t , T1 ∧ T ≤ t < T
(5.3.14)
where XT1∧T,x,∗ is defined in (5.3.3) with initial condition XT1∧T,x,∗T1∧T = x.
To this end, it is sufficient to prove that(






is a uniformly integrable martingale. Indeed, if this is true, then it follows from
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the optional sampling theorem that
ŷ(T1 ∧ T, x, v) = E
[








τ̂∗ ∧ T,XT1∧T,x,∗τ̂∗∧T + φ(τ̂
∗ ∧ T , V T1∧T,vτ̂∗∧T )
)∣∣∣GT1∧T ]
≤ Ŷ λ(T1 ∧ T, x, v),
which, together with (5.3.7), implies (5.3.13) holds and (τ̂∗, π̂∗) defined in
(5.3.14) is the optimal control / stopping strategy to the auxiliary problem
(5.3.12).
Now, it remains to prove that (5.3.15) is a uniformly integrable martingale.
The uniform integrability property is obvious, and the martingale property can
be proved as follows. Using the similar arguments as in step 1, we can observe
the control π∗ achieves equality at the crucial step (5.3.5), and therefore,
y(Ti−1 ∧ T, x, v) = E
[




for any 1 ≤ i ≤M . Then we have, for 2 ≤ i ≤M ,
E
[













Conditional on the set {τ̂∗ ≥ Ti ∧ T}, we have
E
[




















= y(Ti−1 ∧ T,XT1∧T,x,∗Ti−1∧T , V
T1∧T,v
Ti−1∧T )
= ŷ(Ti−1 ∧ T,XT1∧T,x,∗Ti−1∧T , V
T1∧T,v
Ti−1∧T )
where the second equality follows from (5.3.16), and the last equality follows
from (5.3.14). By plugging the above equation into (5.3.17), we obtain the
required martingale property of (5.3.15).



























τ̂∗ ∧ T,X0,x,∗τ̂∗∧T + φ(τ̂
∗ ∧ T , V 0,vτ̂∗∧T )
)]
.
This gives y(0, x, v) = Y λ(x, v) and (τ∗, π∗) is the optimal control / stopping









= U(Ti ∧ T,X
T1∧T,X0,x,∗T1∧T ,∗






Ti ≥ T1 : ŷ(Ti ∧ T,X0,x,∗Ti∧T , V
0,v
Ti∧T )






Ti ≥ T1 : y(Ti ∧ T,X0,x,∗Ti∧T , V
0,v
Ti∧T )





5.4 Exponential indifference bond price
In the remaining of the chapter, we model the creditor’s risk preferences via
horizon-unbiased exponential performance utility




where γ > 0 is the creditor’s risk aversion parameter. This horizon-unbiased
exponential performance utility has been widely used in the related literature,
see, for example, [35] and [14].
Using the analytical properties of exponential utility, we can eliminate
wealth-dependence and reduce to a one-spatial-dimensional free boundary
problem. The benefit is we can easily obtain the existence of optimal trading
strategy, and then verify the assumptions imposed to Theorem 5.3.1 for the
105
complete characterization. Other utilities could be studied, though the solution
would be less tractable due to an increase in spatial dimension.
In the case of exponential utility, we present the following verification
theorem for indifference bond price P λ(x, v).
Proposition 5.4.1 Let p be a function in C1,2([0, T )×R+)∩C([0, T ]×R+),
satisfying
−∂tp(t, v)− L2p(t, v) + λγ−1 min{e−γ(φ(t,v)−p(t,v)) − 1, 0} = 0,











and if moreover, both p(t, v) and v∂vp(t, v) are uniformly bounded, then PDE
(5.3.1) is uniquely solvable in C1,2,2([0, T )×R×R+) ∩ C([0, T ]×R×R+),
y(·, Xπ· , V·) is uniformly integrable for any π ∈ U0,T , there exists a unique
pair of (π∗, X∗) satisfying (5.3.2) and (5.3.3), and π∗ ∈ U0,T . As a result,
P λ(x, v) = p(0, v) for v ∈ R+, i.e. P λ(x, v) is independent of the initial wealth
x, and moreover, the control / stopping strategy given by{
τ∗ = inf {Ti ≥ T1 : p(Ti ∧ T, VTi∧T ) ≤ φ(Ti ∧ T , VTi∧T )}
π∗t = ξ(γσS)
−1 − ρσV σ−1S Vt∂vp(t, Vt)
(5.4.3)
is optimal of the mixed stochastic control and constrained optimal stopping
problem (5.2.3) with exponential performance utility.
Proof. Let y(t, x, v) = U(t, x + p(t, v)), we have y ∈ C1,2,2([0, T ) ×R ×
R+)∩C([0, T ]×R×R+). By the boundedness of p(t, v) and the definition of
the admissible control set, we can have y(·, Xπ· , V·) is uniformly integrable for
any π ∈ U0,T . Since ∂2xxy(t, x, v) = γ2y(t, x, v) < 0, then
π∗(t, x, v) = −ξσ−1S
∂xy(t, x, v)
∂2xxy(t, x, v)




−1 − ρσV σ−1S v∂vp(t, v)
which is well defined, attains the maximum of Lπ1 . Note that π∗ is independent
of x, we can rewrite π∗(t, x, v) in the following form
π∗(t, v) = ξ(γσS)
−1 − ρσV σ−1S v∂vp(t, v).
Then we can define the optimal trading strategy π∗ as follows
π∗t = π
∗(t, Vt) = ξ(γσS)
−1 − ρσV σ−1S Vt∂vp(t, Vt)
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for t ∈ [0, T ). Since the optimal trading strategy π∗ is independent of X∗, SDE
(5.3.3) admits a unique solution.
We can also verify that π∗ is an admissible strategy, i.e. π∗ ∈ U0,T . Indeed,
π∗ is bounded due to the boundedness of v∂vp(t, v), and hence satisfies both
the integrability condition and the class (D) condition.
As a a result, the conditions of Theorem 5.3.1 are all satisfied, which implies
Y λ(x, v) = y(0, x, v) = U(0, x+ p(0, v)),




Ti ≥ T1 : y(Ti ∧ T,X∗Ti∧T , VTi∧T )




Ti ≥ T1 : U(Ti ∧ T,X∗Ti∧T + p(Ti ∧ T, VTi∧T ))




Ti ≥ T1 : p(Ti ∧ T, VTi∧T ) ≤ φ(Ti ∧ T , VTi∧T )
}
.
The above verification proposition only gives the conditional characteriz-
ation of mixed stochastic control and constrained optimal stopping problem
(5.2.3) with exponential performance utility. The complete characterization,
however, is based on the solvability of PDE (5.4.2) and the uniform boundedness
of p(t, v) and v∂vp(t, v), which will be studied in the following lemma.
For the convenience in the analysis, we let θ = T − t, z = ln v, u(θ, z) =





















γ(1− ρ2)σ2V (∂zu)2 := Lu(θ, z),
and therefore, u(θ, z) satisfies
∂θu(θ, z)− Lu(θ, z) + λγ−1 min{e−γ(φ(T−θ,e
z)−u(θ,z)) − 1, 0} = 0,
u(0, z) = φ(T, ez), (5.4.4)
on (0, T ]×R.
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Remark 5.4.2 For the convenience of the reader, we recall the definition of
viscosity sub-and supersolutions for later use. Consider a non-linear second
order degenerate partial differential equation
F (x, u(x), Du(x), D2u(x)) = 0 for x ∈ O, (5.4.5)
where O is an open subset of Rd and F is a continuous map from O ×R ×
Rd × Sd → R satisfying the so-called ellipticity condition:
F (x, r, p, A) ≤ F (x, r, p, B) whenever A ≥ B
for all (x, r, p) ∈ O ×R×Rd and A,B ∈ Sd.
Let u : O → R be a continuous function:
1. We say that u is a viscosity supersolution of (5.4.5) if
F (x0, u(x0), Dϕ(x0), D
2ϕ(x0)) ≥ 0
for all pairs of (x0, ϕ) ∈ O × C2(O) such that x0 is a minimizer of the
difference (u− ϕ) on O.
2. We say that u is a viscosity subsolution of (5.4.5) if
F (x0, u(x0), Dϕ(x0), D
2ϕ(x0)) ≤ 0
for all pairs of (x0, ϕ) ∈ O × C2(O) such that x0 is a maximizer of the
difference (u− ϕ) on O.
3. We say that u is a viscosity solution of (5.4.5) if it is both a viscosity
supersolution and subsolution of (5.4.5).
Lemma 5.4.3 Suppose that there exists a solution u(θ, z) ∈ C1,2((0, T ]×R)∩
C([0, T ]×R) to PDE (5.4.4). Then, u(θ, z) satisfies
0 ≤ u(θ, z) ≤ Ker+T , (5.4.6)
0 ≤ ∂zu(θ, z) ≤ Ker
+T . (5.4.7)
Proof. We prove both estimates (5.4.6)-(5.4.7) using the comparison
principle. Firstly, the estimate (5.4.6) follows immediately from the observation
that w1 = 0 and w2 = Ke
r+T are the subsolution and supersolution of (5.4.4).
Secondly, the estimate (5.4.7) can be verified by constructing a penalty
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approximation of (5.4.4). Suppose uε(θ, z) satisfies
∂θuε(θ, z)− Luε(θ, z) + λγ−1πε(e−γ(πε(e
z−KT−θ)+KT−θ−uε(θ,z)) − 1) = 0,
uε(0, z) = πε(e
z −KT ) +KT , (5.4.8)




z, z ≤ −ε,
↗, |z| ≤ ε,
0, z ≥ ε.






zzw − σV (η − ρξ −
1
2




w − π′ε(ez −KT−θ)ez
)
= 0, (5.4.9)
where y = −γ(πε(ez − KT−θ) + KT−θ − uε(θ, z)), with the initial condition
w(0, z) = π′ε(e
z −KT )ez.
Since w1 = 0 and w2 = Ke
r+T + ε are the subsolution and supersolution of
(5.4.9), we can obtain
0 ≤ ∂zuε(θ, z) ≤ Ker
+T + ε
by the comparison principle. By letting ε→ 0, we have a continuous limit (of a
subsequence if necessary) ∂zu(θ, z), it follows from Arzela-Ascoli Compactness
Criterion that ∂zuε(θ, z)→ ∂zu(θ, z) uniformly in C((0, T ]×R), and thus we
obtain the required result (see, for example, Proof of Lemma 5 in [14]).
We are now in a position to present the complete characterization of the
value function Y λ of mixed stochastic control and constrained optimal stopping
problem (5.2.3) with exponential performance utility (5.4.1), and exponential
indifference bond price P λ. Applying Theorem 5.3.1, Proposition 5.4.1 and
Lemma 5.4.3, we can conclude the following Theorem 5.4.4.
Theorem 5.4.4 Suppose that there exists a solution u(θ, z) ∈ C1,2((0, T ] ×
R) ∩ C([0, T ]×R) to PDE (5.4.4). Then, the following statements hold.
1. Exponential indifference bond price with stopping constraints P λ(x, v),
which is defined in (5.2.4) with exponential performance utility (5.4.1), is
independent of the initial wealth x, and P λ(x, v) = p(0, v), where p(t, v)
is the unique C1,2([0, T )×R+) ∩ C([0, T ]×R+) solution to (5.4.2);
2. The value function Y λ(x, v) of the mixed stochastic control and con-
strained optimal stopping problem (5.2.3) with exponential perform-
ance utility (5.4.1) has the form Y λ(x, v) = U(0, x + P λ(x, v)), and
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Y λ(x, v) = y(0, x, v), where y(t, x, v) is the unique C1,2,2([0, T ) × R ×
R+) ∩ C([0, T ]×R×R+) solution to (5.3.1); and moreover, the corres-
ponding optimal control / stopping strategy is given by (5.4.3).
5.4.1 Properties of exponential indifference bond price
In this subsection, we investigate the impact of parameters on exponential
indifference bond price as a consequence of the complete characterization
Theorem 5.4.4.
Proposition 5.4.5 Exponential indifference bond price P λ(x, v) is increasing
w.r.t. η, r and λ, decreasing w.r.t. γ, and increasing w.r.t. ξ if ρ ≤ 0 and
decreasing w.r.t. ξ if ρ ≥ 0.
Proof. Step 1. Suppose that η1 > η2, and uε(i)(θ, z) is the solution to the














−γ(πε(ez−KT−θ)+KT−θ−uε(i)) − 1) = 0,
with the initial condition uε(i)(0, z) = πε(e
z − KT ) + KT . Then w(θ, z) :=













+ λπ′ε(·)e−γ·w = σV (η1 − η2)∂zuε(2) ≥ 0.
Combined with the initial condition w(0, z) = 0, we have uε(1)(θ, z) ≥ uε(2)(θ, z).
By letting ε→ 0, we obtain u(θ, z) is increasing w.r.t. η.
Similarly, we can prove the monotonicities wr.t. λ and ξ.
Step 2. Suppose that r1 > r2, and uε(i)(θ, z) is the solution to the following
















T−θ−uε(i)) − 1) = 0,
with the initial condition uε(i)(0, z) = πε(e
z −KiT ) + KiT , where Kit = Kerit.
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z −K1T−θ)− πε(ez −K2T−θ) +K1T−θ −K2T−θ
]
= λπ′ε(·)e−γ·(1− π′ε(·))(K1T−θ −K2T−θ) ≥ 0.
Combined with the initial condition
w(0, z) = πε(e
z −K1T )− πε(ez −K2T ) +K1T −K2T = (1− π′ε(·))(K1T −K2T ) ≥ 0,
we have uε(1)(θ, z) ≥ uε(2)(θ, z). By letting ε→ 0, we obtain u(θ, z) is increasing
w.r.t. r.
Step 3. Suppose that γ1 > γ2, and uε(i)(θ, z) is the solution to the following














−γi(πε(ez−KT−θ)+KT−θ−uε(i)) − 1) = 0,
with the initial condition uε(i)(0, z) = πε(e
z − KT ) + KT . Then w(θ, z) :=























(γ2 − γ1)(1− ρ2)σ2V (∂zuε(2))2 ≤ 0
where the second inequality holds since it is easy to prove that the mapping
γ 7→ γ−1πε(e−γy − 1) is increasing w.r.t. γ for any y ∈ R. Combined with the
initial condition w(0, z) = 0, we have uε(1)(θ, z) ≤ uε(2)(θ, z). By letting ε→ 0,
we obtain u(θ, z) is decreasing w.r.t. γ.
The intuition behind the impacts with respect to η and ξ is that greater
chance of the bond providing better opportunities will impact on its value in
the same direction, where “better” is in the sense of a greater payoff in the
future. This happens more frequently with the greater Sharpe ratio of V or
the lower relative Sharpe ratio of S, where the correlation ρ palys a role in the
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relativity.
With higher spread rate r, the creditor will benefit from receiving more
interest payment from the firm, which therefore makes the bond more attractive.
The higher intensity of the signaling Poisson process λ will also impact on the
bond value in the same direction, since the higher λ provides more flexibility
for the creditor. In the extreme situation of λ → ∞, where the creditor is
allowed to withdraw her money at any time, the original problem (5.2.3) is
reduced to a standard mixed control and stopping problem, where the creditor
is not exposed to stopping constraints. This will be further discussed in the
next section.
The higher risk aversion γ will impact on the bond value in the opposite
direction. Waiting involves facing random fluctuations in V , which can only
be partially hedged away by trading in incomplete markets. If the creditor is
more risk averse, she will less appreciate this bond with idiosyncratic risk. In
the extreme case of one correlation, the market is complete, and there is no
idiosyncratic risk, and hence the value of γ will have no impact on the bond
value.
However, the general monotonicity with respect to the correlation ρ is
uncertain due to the role of the Sharpe ratio of S, i.e. ξ. ρ will impact on
the bond price in two ways. Since V can only be partially hedged, the higher
|ρ| implies the less idiosyncratic risk she is exposed to, which resultis in the
higher bond price. This is the first way. The second way is through the relative
Sharpe ratio of S, i.e. ρξ. As explained earlier, the higher relative Sharpe ratio
will impact on the bond price in the opposite direction. These two ways might
lead the bond price into opposite direction, and hence we can only obtain the
conditional monotonicity, in the case where these two ways have the same
direction.
The following proposition gives the conditional monotonicity of exponential
indifference bond price with respect to the correlation.
Proposition 5.4.6 Exponential indifference bond price P λ(x, v) is increasing
w.r.t. ρ if ρ ≥ 0 and ξ ≤ 0, and decreasing w.r.t. ρ if ρ ≤ 0 and ξ ≥ 0.
Proof. Suppose that ρ1 > ρ2 ≥ 0 with ξ ≤ 0, and uε(i)(θ, z) is the solution












γ(1− ρ2i )σ2V (∂zuε(i))2
+ λγ−1πε(e
−γ(πε(ez−K)+K−uε(i)) − 1) = 0,
with the initial condition uε(i)(0, z) = πε(e
z − K) + K. Then w(θ, z) :=
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γ(1− ρ21)σ2V (∂zuε(1) + ∂zuε(2))∂zw + λγ−1π′ε(·)w
= σV (ρ2 − ρ1)ξ∂zuε(2) +
1
2
γ(ρ21 − ρ22)σ2V (∂zuε(2))2 ≥ 0.
Combined with the initial condition w(0, z) = 0, we have uε(1)(θ, z) ≥ uε(2)(θ, z).
By letting ε → 0, we obtain u(θ, z) is increasing w.r.t. ρ if ρ ≥ 0 and ξ ≤ 0.
We can prove the second statement using the similar arguments.
5.5 Asymptotics as λ→∞
A relevant question for the problem (5.2.3) is the following: what is the cost of
having such constraints on the stopping times? In other words, how does this
problem differ from standard mixed stochastic control and optimal stopping
problem, which can be regarded as the limiting model when λ→∞.
5.5.1 Review of standard mixed control/stopping problems
Let T[t,T ] denote the collection of all F-stopping times with values in [t, T ].
Define the following standard mixed stochastic control and optimal stopping
problem corresponding to the mixed stochastic control and constrained optimal
stopping problem (5.2.3):
Y (x, v) = ess sup
τ∈T[0,T ],π∈U0,τ∧T
E [U (τ ∧ T,Xπτ∧T + φ(τ ∧ T , Vτ∧T ))] , (5.5.1)
and (τ∗, π∗) ∈ T[0,T ] × U0,τ∗∧T is called an optimal control / stopping strategy
for the problem (5.5.1) if




τ∗ ∧ T,Xπ∗τ∗∧T + φ(τ∗ ∧ T , Vτ∗∧T )
)]
.
The corresponding creditor’s indifference bond price without stopping constraints
P (x, v) is defined by the following equation
Y (x, v) = U(0, x+ P (x, v)) (5.5.2)
where Y is given by (5.5.1).
Similar to Theorem 5.4.4, in the case of exponential performance utility
(5.4.1), the following theorem gives the complete characterization of the value
function Y and indifference bond price without stopping constraints P . What’s
more, we also make the connection between the problems with and without
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stopping constraints.
Before stating the main theorem of this section, we introduce the following
two Sobolev spaces with certain regularity: for any p ≥ 1,
(i) W 1,2p ([0, T )×R+) is the completion of C∞([0, T )×R+) under the norm
||u||
W 1,2p ([0,T )×R+) =
[∫
[0,T )×R+
(|u|p + |∂tu|p + |∂vu|p + |∂vvu|p) dt dv
]1/p
.
(ii) W 1,2,2p ([0, T )×R×R+) is the completion of C∞([0, T )×R×R+) under
the norm
||u||
W 1,2p ([0,T )×R×R+) =
[ ∫
[0,T )×R×R+
(|u|p + |∂tu|p + |∂xu|p + |∂vu|p
+ |∂xvu|p + |∂xxu|p + |∂vvu|p) dt dv dx
]1/p
.
Theorem 5.5.1 The following statements hold.
1. Exponential indifference bond price without stopping constraints P (x, v),
which is defined in (5.5.2) with exponential performance utility (5.4.1), is
independent of the initial wealth x, and P (x, v) = pc(0, v), where pc(t, v)
is the unique W 1,2p ([0, T )×R+)∩C([0, T ]×R+) solution to the following
equation:
min {−∂tpc(t, v)− L2pc(t, v), pc(t, v)− φ(t, v)} = 0,
pc(T, v) = φ(T, v);
(5.5.3)
2. The value function Y (x, v) of the mixed stochastic control and optimal
stopping problem (5.5.1) with exponential performance utility (5.4.1) has
the form Y (x, v) = U(0, x + P (x, v)), and Y (x, v) = y(0, x, v), where
yc(t, x, v) is the unique W 1,2,2p ([0, T ) × R × R+) ∩ C([0, T ] × R × R+)
solution to the following equation:
min
{
−∂tyc(t, x, v)− sup
π∈R
Lπ1yc(t, x, v), yc(t, x, v)− U(t, x+ φ(t, v))
}
= 0,
yc(T, x, v) = U (T, x+ φ(T, v)) ; (5.5.4)
and moreover, the corresponding optimal control / stopping strategy is
given by{
τ∗ = inf {t ≥ 0 : pc(t ∧ T, Vt∧T ) = φ(t ∧ T , Vt∧T )} ,
π∗t = ξ(γσS)




3. As λ goes to infinity, we have the following convergence results
P (x, v) = lim
λ→∞
P λ(x, v),
Y (x, v) = lim
λ→∞
Y λ(x, v).
Proof. The proof of the first two statements follows along the similar
arguments in [14] and is thus omitted. To prove the convergence result for Y ,
we note that PDE (5.3.1) can be regarded as a sequence of penalized PDEs for
(5.5.4) (see, for example, [28]), then the convergence follows.
5.5.2 A complete market model
In this subsection, we consider a rollover dedt without stopping constraints in
a complete market, where we can solve in closed form both the bond price and
optimal stopping strategy. The set-up is the same as in Section 5.5.1 except for
ρ = 1. For later use, we define the stopping region (S) and the continuation
region (C) for this problem as
S := {(t, v) ∈ [0, T )×R+ : pc(t, v) = φ(t, v)}
C := {(t, v) ∈ [0, T )×R+ : pc(t, v) > φ(t, v))}
where pc is the solution to (5.5.3), and therefore, the optimal stopping strategy
τ∗, given by (5.5.5), has the following representation
τ∗ = inf {t ≥ 0 : (t, Vt) ∈ S} ∧ T.
Theorem 5.5.2 In the complete market where ρ = 1,
(a) if r ≤ 0 and η ≤ ξ, then S = [0, T )×R+ and P (x, v) = min{v,K};
(b) if r ≤ 0 and η > ξ, then S = {(t, v) ∈ [0, T )×R+ : v ≥ Kt} and
P (x, v) =
{
pc(0, v) v < K
K v ≥ K
where pc is the classical solution of
−∂tpc − L̂2pc = 0 on [0, T )× (0,Kt)
pc(T, v) = v on (0,KT ]
pc(t,Kt) = Kt on [0, T )
(5.5.6)
with L̂2 = 12σ
2
V v
2∂2vv + σV (η − ξ)v∂v.
115
(c) if r > 0 and η ≤ ξ, then S = {(t, v) ∈ [0, T )×R+ : v ≤ Kt} and
P (x, v) =
{
v v ≤ K
p̂c(0, v) v > K
where p̂c is the classical solution of
−∂tp̂c − L̂2p̂c = 0 on [0, T )× (Kt,∞)
p̂c(T, v) = KT on [KT ,∞)
p̂c(t,Kt) = Kt on [0, T )
. (5.5.7)












































T − t (5.5.8)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal distri-
bution,
• and, moreover, if f(0) ≥ 0, then S = {(t, v) ∈ [0, T )×R+ : v = Kt} and
P (x, v) = p̃c(0, v), where the latter is given by
p̃c(t, v) =
{
pc(t, v) v ≤ Kt
p̂c(t, v) v ≥ Kt
; (5.5.9)
• otherwise, then S = {(t, v) ∈ [tc∗, T )×R+ : v = Kt}, where
tc∗ := inf{t ≥ 0 : f(t) ≥ 0} > 0, (5.5.10)
and P (x, v) = p̌c(0, v), where p̌c(t, v) = p̃c(t, v) in (5.5.9) for t ∈ [tc∗, T ],
and p̌c is the classical solution of{
−∂tp̌c − L̂2p̌c = 0 on [0, tc∗)× (0,∞)
p̌c(tc∗, v) = p̃
c(tc∗, v) on (0,∞)
(5.5.11)
for t ∈ [0, tc∗).
116
5.5.3 Proof of Theorem 5.5.2




−∂tpc(t, v)− L̂2pc(t, v), pc(t, v)− φ(t, v)
}
= 0,
pc(T, v) = φ(T, v).
(5.5.12)
Case (a).
If r ≤ 0 and η ≤ ξ, both pc1 = Kt and pc2 = v are the supersolutions of (5.5.12),
using the comparison principle, we can obtain that pc ≤ φ(t, v), and therefore
pc = φ(t, v). This implies
S = [0, T )×R+,
i.e. τ∗ = 0; and moreover, P (x, v) = pc(0, v) = min{v,K}.
Case (b).
If r ≤ 0 and η > ξ, we prove that pc(t, v), which is given by
pc(t, v) =
{
pc(t, v), on [0, T )× (0,Kt)
Kt, on [0, T )× [Kt,∞)
,
is the viscosity solution of (5.5.12), where pc solves (5.5.6). Indeed, since
pc1 = Kt and p
c
2 = v are the supersolution and subsolution of (5.5.6), using
the comparison principle, we can obtain that v < pc ≤ Kt on [0, T )× (0,Kt),
which implies that
∂vp
c(t,Kt−) ≥ 0. (5.5.13)
It is sufficient to prove that pc is a viscosity supersolution of the equation
−∂tpc − L̂2pc = 0.
Since pc is a classical solution except on the curve v = Kt, it is sufficient to
focus on the equation on this curve. Thanks to (5.5.13), there are two following
cases.
• If ∂vpc(t,Kt−) = 0, then ∂vpc(t,Kt) = 0. For all ϕ ∈ C1,2 such that
pc(t, v) − ϕ(t, v) ≥ 0 and pc(t0,Kt0) − ϕ(t0,Kt0) = 0, and therefore we
have
∂vp
c(t0,Kt0) = ∂vϕ(t0,Kt0) and ∂tp
c(t0,Kt0) ≥ ∂tϕ(t0,Kt0). (5.5.14)
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We claim the following inequality
∂vvp
c(t0,Kt0−)− ∂vvϕ(t0,Kt0) ≥ 0 (5.5.15)
holds, and by (5.5.6), (5.5.14) and (5.5.15), we can obtain that
−∂tϕ(t0,Kt0)− L̂2ϕ(t0,Kt0) ≥ 0
which completes the proof. Indeed, in order to prove (5.5.15), we as-
sume ∂vvp
c(t0,Kt0−) − ∂vvϕ(t0,Kt0) < 0, then ∂vpc(t0, v) − ∂vϕ(t0, v)
is decreasing in the left neighbourhood (Kt0 − δ,Kt0). This implies
∂vp
c(t0, v) − ∂vϕ(t0, v) > 0 for v ∈ [Kt0 − δ,Kt0 ], and thus pc(t0, v) −
ϕ(t0, v) is increasing in the left neighbourhood (Kt0 − δ,Kt0), which
contradicts the assumption that pc − ϕ attains its minimum at (t0,Kt0).
• If ∂vpc(t,Kt−) > 0, the supersolution property is obviously satisfied since
there is no smooth function ϕ ∈ C1,2 satisfying the minimum condition.
This implies that
S = {(t, v) ∈ [0, T )×R+ : v ≥ Kt},
and moreover, we solve PDE (5.5.6) in Appendix 5.A.1 and obtain that
P (x, v) = pc(0, v) =
{
pc(0, v) v < K
K v ≥ K
where pc is given by (5.A.3).
Case (c).
If r > 0 and η ≤ ξ, we prove that pc(t, v), which is given by
pc(t, v) =
{
v, on [0, T )× (0,Kt]
p̂c(t, v), on [0, T )× (Kt,∞)
,
is the viscosity solution of (5.5.12), where p̂c solves (5.5.7). Indeed, since
p̂c1 = v and p̂
c
2 = Kt are the supersolution and subsolution of (5.5.7), using
the comparison principle, we can obtain that Kt < p̂
c ≤ v on [0, T )× (0,Kt),
which implies that
∂vp
c(t,Kt+) ≤ 1. (5.5.16)
It is sufficient to show pc is a viscosity supersolution of the equation
−∂tpc − L̂2pc = 0,
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which can be proved using the similar arguments of Case (b). This implies that
S = {(t, v) ∈ [0, T )×R+ : v ≤ Kt},
and moreover, we solve PDE (5.5.7) in Appendix 5.A.2 and obtain that
P (x, v) = pc(0, v) =
{
v v ≤ K
p̂c(0, v) v > K
where p̂c is given by (5.A.4).
Case (d).
If r > 0 and η > ξ, we can see pc1 = Kt is the subsolution of of (5.5.12) on
[0, T ) × (0,Kt) and pc2 = v is the subsolution of (5.5.12) on [0, T ) × (Kt,∞).
Using the comparison principle, we can obtain that pc > v on [0, T )× (0,Kt)
and pc > Kt on [0, T )× (Kt,∞). This implies that the possible set in S is the
curve v = Kt.
The key point to prove whether S is the whole curve v = Kt (i.e. p̃c
in (5.5.9) is the solution of (5.5.12)) is the sign of the function f in (5.5.8).
Thanks to the explicit form of pc and p̂c, which are given by (5.A.3) and (5.A.4)
respectively, standard calculation shows that
f(t) = ∂vp
c(t,Kt−)− ∂vp̂c(t,Kt+). (5.5.17)
In other words, if f(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], p̃c is concave at (t,Kt), and
then p̃c in (5.5.9) is the solution of (5.5.12). To this end, we start with the
following lemma on the monotonicity property of the auxiliary function f .
Lemma 5.5.3 f(t) in (5.5.8) is increasing with f(T ) = 1.
Proof. By the transformation
u(τ, w) = e−r(T−τ)pc(T − τ,KT−τew)−K, (5.5.18)











∂wu− ru = rK on (0, T ]× (−∞, 0)
u(0, w) = K(ew − 1) on (−∞, 0]
u(τ, 0) = 0 on (0, T ]
,
and it is easy to prove that ∂τu ≥ 0. Thus, for any 0 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ T , by the
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definition of left derivative and the fact that ∂vp
c(t,Kt−) = 1K ∂wu

























c(t,Kt−) is increasing in t. Likewise, we can prove ∂vp̂c(t,Kt+)
is decreasing in t. Using (5.5.17), we have f(t) is increasing in t, with
f(T ) = ∂vp
c(T,KT−)− ∂vp̂c(T,KT+) = 1− 0 = 1.
As a direct consequence, by the definition (5.5.10) of tc∗, we have f(t) ≥ 0
for t ∈ [tc∗, T ]. We are now in a position to prove Case (d).
On the one hand, if f(0) ≥ 0, it follows that ∂2vvp̃c(t,Kt) ≤ 0 for any
t ∈ [0, T ), by (5.5.6)-(5.5.7), and thus
−∂tp̃c − L̂2p̃c ≥ 0
on [0, T )× (0,∞). Moreover, we have p̃c(t, v) ≥ φ(t, v), where the equality only
holds on the curve v = Kt. This gives that S = {(t, v) ∈ [0, T )×R+ : v = Kt}.
On the other hand, if f(0) < 0, then tc∗ ∈ (0, T ). It is clear that p̌c is the
solution of (5.5.12) on [tc∗, T ]. To prove p̌
c is the solution of (5.5.12) on [0, tc∗),










c(tc∗,Ktc∗+) by (5.5.6)-(5.5.7), which implies
∂2vvp̌
c(tc∗,Ktc∗) exists. Again, using the transformation
ǔ(τ, w) = e−r(T−τ)p̌c(T − τ,KT−τew)−K, (5.5.19)
















c)− r(∂τ ǔc) = 0
on (T − tc∗, T ]× (−∞,∞), with the initial condition
∂τ ǔ
c(T − tc∗, w) = ∂τuc(T − tc∗, w) ≥ 0,
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and it follows from the comparison principle that ∂τ ǔ
c(τ, w) > 0 on (T −
tc∗, T ]× (−∞,∞). In turn,
ǔc(τ, w) > uc(T − tc∗, w)
for (τ, w) ∈ (T − tc∗, T ]× (−∞,∞), or equivalently,
p̌c(t, v) > er(t−t
c
∗)p̌c(tc∗, e
−r(t−tc∗)v) ≥ φ(t, v)
for (t, v) ∈ [0, tc∗)× (0,∞). Also, this gives p̌c(t,Kt) > Kt for t ∈ [0, tc∗), i.e.
S = {(t, v) ∈ [tc∗, T )×R+ : v = Kt}.
The proof of Theorem 5.5.2 is now completed.
Different optimal stopping strategies of the rollover debt without stopping
constraints in the compelet market, where ρ = 1, are depicted in Figure 5.1.
The theoretical analysis in Theorem 5.5.2 shows that the form of the stopping
and continuation regions (at least excluding the curve v = Kt) is determined
by the signs of r and η− ξ. An interesting observation is that both regions are
swapped over for different parameter values. The financial intuition behind it




























(d) r > 0, η > ξ
Figure 5.1: Different optimal stopping strategies of the rollover debt without
stopping constraints in a compelet market.
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5.6 Numerical results for optimal stopping strategy
In this section, we investigate the optimal stopping strategy of the mixed
stochastic control and constrained optimal stopping problem in (5.2.3) with
exponential performance utility (5.4.1). Similar to Section 5.5.2, we define the
stopping region (Sλ) and the continuation region (Cλ) for the problem:
Sλ := {(t, v) ∈ [0, T )×R+ : p(t, v) ≤ φ(t, v)} (5.6.1)
Cλ := {(t, v) ∈ [0, T )×R+ : p(t, v) > φ(t, v)} (5.6.2)
where p is the solution to (5.4.2), and therefore, the optimal stopping strategy
τ∗, given by (5.4.3), has the following representation
τ∗ = inf
{
Ti ≥ T1 : (Ti, VTi) ∈ Sλ
}
∧ TM .
Inspired by Theorem 5.5.2, we can expect the form of the stopping and
continuation regions depends on parameter values. The following corollary
gives some parts of the stopping regions for different parameter values, and
this result is consistent with what was obtained in Section 5.5.2.
Corollary 5.6.1 If r ≤ 0, the following statement holds
{(t, v) ∈ [0, T )×R+ : v ≥ Kt} ⊂ Sλ.
If η ≤ ρξ, the following statement holds
{(t, v) ∈ [0, T )×R+ : v ≤ Kt} ⊂ Sλ.
Proof. In the case of r ≤ 0, we can see p1 = Kt is the supersolution of
(5.4.2). Using the comparison principle, we can obtain that p ≤ Kt. This
implies p ≤ φ on {(t, v) ∈ [0, T ) × R+ : v ≥ Kt}, and therefore, the first
statement holds. Similarly, we can prove the second statement using the fact
that p2 = v is the supersolution of (5.4.2) if η ≤ ρξ.
The financial intuition behind this corollary is as follows. On the one hand,
with a nonpositive spread rate (i.e. r ≤ 0), the creditor should withdraw
her money as soon as the firm has enough debt-paying ability to cover its
debt obligations. On the other hand, when the bond fails to provide better
opportunities than the risky asset S to obtain a greater payoff in the future
(i.e. η ≤ ρξ), given the firm’s weak debt-paying potential, it is unwise for
the creditor to wait for the firm to improve its value, and therefore, her best
interest is to withdraw her money as soon as the firm is insolvent.
At the end of this chapter, we conduct some numerical experiments to
examine the shapes of Sλ (the stopping region) and Cλ (the continuation
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region), which are defined by (5.6.1) and (5.6.2) respectively, for different
parameter values, where a numerical algorithm to approximate the solution of
PDE (5.4.2) is provided in Appendix 5.B.
The structure of Sλ in the case of r ≤ 0
If η ≤ ρξ, as a direct consequence of Corollary 5.6.1, we can obtain
Sλ = [0, T )×R+
which means the creditor should withdraw her money as soon as possible. As
shown in Figure 5.2a, with three simulated firm value paths and three (given)
Poisson times T1=.15, T2=.5 and T3=.8, she should choose to withdraw her
money at time .15 for all the paths.
However, with higher value of η − ρξ (other parameters being fixed), the
bond starts to provide better opportunities than the risky asset S, then the
creditor’s best interest is to continue to roll over the debt, even when the firm
is currently insolvent, to wait for the firm to improve its value in the future.
In Figure 5.2b, we can observe that
{(t, v) ∈ [0, T )×R+ : v ≥ Kt} ⊂ Sλ = {(t, v) ∈ [0, T )×R+ : v ≥ v∗(t)}
where v∗ : [0, T ) → R+ is the optimal withdrawal boundary. With three
simulated firm value paths and three (given) Poisson times T1=.15, T2=.5
and T3=.8, she should choose to withdraw her money at time .15, .8 and 1,
respectively.
The structure of Sλ in the case of r > 0
If η ≤ ρξ, Corollary 5.6.1 gives that
{(t, v) ∈ [0, T )×R+ : v ≤ Kt} ⊂ Sλ,
which implies that the creditor should withdraw her money if the firm is
insolvent. In Figure 5.2c, numerically, we can observe
{(t, v) ∈ [0, T )×R+ : v ≤ Kt} ⊂ Sλ = {(t, v) ∈ [0, T )×R+ : v ≤ v∗(t)}
where v∗ : [0, T ) → R+ is the optimal withdrawal boundary. The creditor
should choose to continue when the firm value exceeds than the boundary v∗.
This makes sense since, with a high firm value, the creditor is always better off
by not withdrawing her money and continuing to receive positive interest rate
spread. With three simulated firm value paths and three (given) Poisson times
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T1=.15, T2=.5 and T3=.8, she should choose to withdraw her money at time
.15 for all the paths.
Similar to the case of r ≤ 0, by increasing the value of η − ρξ and keeping
other parameters constant, we can observe, in Figure 5.2d, there exist two
seperate continuation regions and one stopping region, i.e.
{(t, v) ∈ [0, T )×R+ : v = Kt} ⊂ Sλ = {(t, v) ∈ [0, T )×R+ : v∗(t) ≤ v ≤ v∗(t)}
where v∗ : [0, T )→ R+ and v∗ : [0, T )→ R+ are the lower and upper optimal
withdrawal boundary, respectively. It is in her best interest to continue to roll
over the debt when the firm value falls below the lower boundary or above
the upper boundary. The creditor will choose to withdraw her money when
the firm value is relatively close to the sum of its debt obligations Kt, since
the gamma at KT is minus infinity at T , which means extremly serious loss
will happen. With three simulated firm value paths and three (given) Poisson
times T1=.15, T2=.5 and T3=.8, she should choose to withdraw her money at
time .15, 1 and 1, respectively.
However, if we continue to increase the value of η − ρξ, we can observe, in
Figure 5.2e, there are only one continuation region and one stopping region,
i.e.
{(t, v) ∈ [t∗, T )×R+ : v = Kt} ⊂ Sλ = {(t, v) ∈ [t∗, T )×R+ : v∗(t) ≤ v ≤ v∗(t)}
where t∗ ∈ [0, T ) is the optimal withdrawal temporal boundary satisfying
v∗(t∗) = v∗(t∗), and v∗ : [t∗, T ) → R+ and v∗ : [t∗, T ) → R+ are the lower
and upper optimal withdrawal boundary, respectively. Up to the optimal
withdrawal temporal boundary t∗, she should continue to roll over the debt
regardless of the firm value. After t∗, it is in her best interest to withdraw
the money when the firm value lies between the lower and upper boundaries.
With three simulated firm value paths and three (given) Poisson times T1=.15,
T2=.5 and T3=.8, she should choose to withdraw her money at time .8, 1 and
1, respectively.
If we further increase the value of η− ρξ, in Figure 5.2f, we can observe the
stopping region disappears and the whole region is the continuation region, i.e.
Sλ = ∅
which means the creditor should continue to roll over the debt regardless of the
firm value. With three simulated firm value paths and three (given) Poisson
times T1=.15, T2=.5 and T3=.8, she should never choose to withdraw her
money until time 1 for all the paths.
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(a) r = 0, η − ρξ = 0 (b) r = 0, η − ρξ = 1
(c) r = .1, η − ρξ = 0 (d) r = .1, η − ρξ = 1
(e) r = .1, η − ρξ = 1.5









(f) r = .1, η − ρξ = 50
Figure 5.2: Scenario simulation. These figures show the shapes of the stopping
and continuation regions of a rollover debt with different parameter values.
Three firm value paths in the model are simulated. The initial firm value is set
to be v = .9 and other parameter values are σS=.2, η = .67, σV = .3, ρ = −.5,
γ = 1, λ = 5, K = 1 and T = 1. The red curves and shaded areas describe
the optimal withdrawal boundaries and the stopping regions for each cases.
Three Poisson times (marked by the asterisks) is given by T1 = .15, T2 = .5
and T3 = .8, and the optimal withdrawal strategies for the creditor are marked
by the black squares.
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5.A The explicit solutions of PDEs (5.5.6) and (5.5.7)
5.A.1 PDE (5.5.6)
By the transformation





, τ(t, v) = T − t, u(τ, w) = e−rtpc(t, v)−K,











∂wu− ru = rK on (0, T ]× (0,∞)
u(0, w) = K(e−w − 1) on [0,∞)
u(τ, 0) = 0 on (0, T ].
We define ū(τ, w) by
u(τ, w) = ū(τ, w)eατ+βw
where
α = r − 1
2σ2V
(





















wwū = rK on (τ, w) ∈ (0, T ]× (0,∞)




on w ∈ [0,∞)
ū(τ, 0) = 0 on τ ∈ (0, T ].




















































































and then we can obtain that





































where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal
distribution, and
d̄1 =




d̄2 = −d1 − 2σV β
√
τ
d̄3 = d2 − σV
√
τ









After rearranging the equations, we can obtain
pc(t, v)
















































































































T − t− s


















, τ(t, v) = T − t, u(τ, w) = e−rtpc(t, v)−K,











∂wu− ru = rK on (0, T ]× (0,∞)
u(0, w) = 0 on [0,∞)
u(τ, 0) = 0 on (0, T ].
We define ū(τ, w) by
u(τ, w) = ū(τ, w)eᾱτ+β̄w






wwū = rK on (τ, w) ∈ (0, T ]× (0,∞)
ū(0, w) = 0 on w ∈ [0,∞)
ū(τ, 0) = 0 on τ ∈ (0, T ].






























































Φ (d7)− Φ (d8) ds
(5.A.4)
where








T − t− s








T − t− s
.
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5.B Numerical approximation of the solution to PDE
(5.4.2)
We now use finite difference method to numerically solve PDE (5.4.2).
By letting a := 12σ
2
V , b := σV (η − ρξ) and c = −
1
2γ(1 − ρ
2)σ2V , we can
rewrite (5.4.2) as
−∂tp−av2∂2vvp−bv∂vp−cv2(∂vp)2+λγ−1 min{e−γ(φ(t,v)−p)−1, 0} = 0 (5.B.1)
with the terminal condition p(T, v) = φ(T, v). In order to solve (5.B.1) nu-
merically, it is necessary to impose the boundary conditions at v = 0+ and
v = +∞. When v = 0+, the payoff at withdrawal time is expected to be
negligible, which gives the boundary condition at v = 0+:
lim
v→0+
p(t, v) = 0.
When v = +∞, the payoff at withdrawal time τ is expected to be Kτ , which
is increasing with time if r ≥ 0 and decreasing with time otherwise. This
motivates the creditor to postpone her withdrawal until time T if r ≥ 0, i.e.
lim
v→+∞
p(t, v) = KT (5.B.2)
in the case of r ≥ 0. However, it is in her best interest to withdraw her money
as soon as possible if r < 0, this gives that
lim
v→+∞
p(t, v) = E[KTi∧T |Vt = v]
where Ti is the first arrival Poisson time after time t, i.e. Ti−1 ≤ t < Ti. By
applying the probability density function of Ti, we can obtain
lim
v→+∞







in the case of r < 0. In the following, we only consider the algorithm in the
case of r ≥ 0 for simplicity, since the algorithm for r < 0 follows immediately
by replacing the boundary condition (5.B.2) with (5.B.3).
In order to remove the square term in (5.B.1), we define






















with correponding terminal and boundary conditions.
We choose v is a very large constant and v is a very small constant such
that realization of v outside the region [v, v] occurs with negligible probability.
By defining

















with the initial and boundary conditions
W (0, w) = e−γ(1−ρ
2)φ(T,vew)
W (τ, 0) = 1
W (τ, ln(v/v)) = e−γ(1−ρ
2)KT .
In the following, we derive the implict finite difference equation for PDE (5.B.4).
Let ∆τ denote the step size between two updates of the value function W in the
time dimension, and ∆w denote the step size between grid points in the space
dimension of W . The range of two variables is taken to be (τ, w) ∈ [0, T ]×[0, w],
where w = ln (v/v). At each grid point, we define
W(i,j) = W (i∆τ, j∆w),
for 0 ≤ i ≤ T∆τ := Nτ and 0 ≤ j ≤
w





























where the constant ξ := λ(1− ρ2)∆τ , the vectors of Nw − 1 elements
Wi :=
[
W(i,1),W(i,2), · · · ,W(i,Nw−1)
]T
Ci := Wi −
[





1·∆w), · · · , e−γφ(T−i∆τ,vej∆w), · · · , e−γφ(T−i∆τ,ve(Nw−1)·∆w)
]T
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and A is a (Nw − 1)× (Nw − 1) tridiagonal matrix
A :=

θ β 0 0
α θ β 0
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
0 · · · θ β
0 · · · α θ
 , (5.B.6)
with α := − a∆τ
∆w2
+ (b−a)∆τ2∆w , β := −
a∆τ
∆w2
− (b−a)∆τ2∆w , and θ := 1 − α − β. The






Finally, for i = 0, 1, · · · , Nτ , we use the standard Newton method to solve
(5.B.5) as follows:
Step 1. Set W̃1 = Wi;










+Bm(W̃m+1 − W̃m) = Ci,
which is equivalent to





















(m,1) − 1, 0) · · · 0
0 · · · 0
0 · · · min(ηi+1,Nw−1W̃
− 1
1−ρ2
(m,Nw−1) − 1, 0)
 ;
Step 3. Suppose the above loop runs M times, then set Wi+1 = W̃M .
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[7] T. R. Bielecki, S. Crépey, M. Jeanblanc, and M. Rutkowski. Arbitrage
pricing of defaultable game options with applications to convertible bonds.
Quantitative Finance, 8(8):795–810, 2008.
[8] J. Bismut. Sur un probleme de dynkin. Probability Theory and Related
Fields, 39(1):31–53, 1977.
[9] B. Bouchard. Lecture notes on BSDEs Main existence and stability results.
PhD diss., CEREMADE-CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la
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